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 Abstract 
Since independence, Zambia has attempted to achieve a level of growth that involves a majority of 
the population. Kenneth Kaunda‟s restructuring towards inclusive growth were unsuccessful 
because, 1) like most Sub-Saharan African countries, Zambia was highly dependent on copper. 
Consequently, fluctuations in copper prices were very influential for the nation‟s social and 
economic development. 2) The elite and tribal relations that were constitutive for the nation also 
became a hindrance to economic growth. The maintenance of stability and tribal balancing became 
central for the Zambian government. Since Kaunda, subsequent political leaders have attempted to 
navigate the Zambian economy towards more inclusive and stable economic growth. After a long 
period of economic decline, high poverty level, a growing informal sector and a decline in copper 
prices, the IMF and the WB pressured Zambia to privatize some of its firms including the copper 
sector in order to boost the sector that once served as the nation‟s fiscal backbone. In this thesis, we 
analyze the different factors and relations that have led to privatization and the consequences of 
privatization for social, economic and political development.  
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Research field  
Motivation and presentation of research area 
The initial motivation for this project was centered on the issues of tax evasion/avoidance its impact 
on government budgets in developing countries and consequently on social, political and economic 
development. As we researched the aforementioned topic, the issue of governance immediately 
surfaced. We began to get into a paradoxical discussion as to whether governance and state capacity 
was influential for a country‟s ability to administer tax laws, put into effect tax collection and the 
ability to include these revenues in government budgets. Or whether the lack of revenues was in 
itself the influence (or perhaps the cause) of “weaknesses” in governance and the state capacity? 
Regardless of how one argues for the paradox above, our conclusion was that, state capacity is a 
relevant topic especially in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). 
State capacity and governance have in the past decades been particularly emphasized by the United 
Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) as core factors for 
stability, security and development (IMF, 2014), (United Nations, 2004).With this inspiration in 
mind, we wanted to investigate what other factors and relations are constructive for social, 
economic and political development
1
. Why is state capacity such a referenced theme in the 
challenges to development in SSA? And what are the challenges to state capacity and state 
legitimacy? One cannot really understand state capacity in SSA without having a clear 
understanding of the institutions (both formal and informal) that are in these societies and their 
effects on the state capacity.  
To further highlight, the impact of institutions on state capacity, we choose to look at how to 
achieve inclusive growth as the approach is included in the Zambian National Development Plan 
(Republic of Zambia, 2011). A level of growth where it is not only a fraction of the population 
(elites) benefited. More importantly a level of growth where the entire population or at least 
majority of the population are involved in the formal economy rather than the informal economy. 
To narrow our analysis down, we have chosen to look at Zambia as a case country. Zambia‟s 
copper sector has been of particular importance for the country‟s economy since the colonization. 
For instance the copper sector has been responsible for employing 62,222 workers in 1976 and this 
number stayed almost constant over the next 15 years (Fraser & Larmer, 2010, p.21). Though 
employment decreased shortly before and during the privatization process, the copper still remains a 
                                                 
1
 After having established from economic theorists like Khan, Douglas and the IMF about the links between political, 
social and economic development, we draw attention that every time we refer to development it will be in these three 
aspects and not only economic development as mostly assumed.  
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very important sector for the Zambian economy. With regards to, achieving inclusive growth we 
find that it is relevant to not only look at copper because of its relevance for the Zambian population 
but also it will help as a reflection on the type of employment possibilities there are and how this 
will help to achieve inclusive growth.   
We cannot deny however that, it seems to be a general characteristic of many countries in SSA to 
have natural resources but somehow still face challenges of poverty, governance and lack of steady 
economic, social and political development. There are many arguments as to why countries in SSA 
are faced with the factors mentioned above. The aim of this thesis is to investigate how Zambia can 
achieve inclusive growth from copper by i) looking at the internal factors in Zambia like state 
capacity, institutions (formal and informal) ii) external factors like copper prices and the IMF‟s 
intervention, from a historical perspective as well as contemporary. Understanding from a historical 
perspective how Zambia‟s state capacity has evolved into what we see in Zambia today, lessons 
learned and how to plan better for the future. This leads us to the following research question: 
Research question 
What social, political and economic relations were constitutive for the privatization of the Zambian 
copper mines and how did the privatization affect these relations, the state capacity and the 
possibility for inclusive growth? 
Methodology 
The validity of knowledge production 
In the study of development in SSA a lot of different normative and theoretical approaches exist. 
These different approaches have a wide range of different methods to dissect, interpret and 
understand development in the region. In some cases the epistemological foundation for these 
methods are not transparent but are yet of crucial importance to the results produced. Even when 
transparent, these foundations for knowledge production can be diverging to say the least if not 
outright in direct contradiction to one another. On the basis of this, we find it central to the validity 
of this thesis to establish a transparent epistemological foundation for the analysis of the ontological 
field of study; the political settlement in Zambia and the ability to establish and sustain inclusive 
growth.  
The factors, analyzed in this thesis are chosen for their perceived role in the process of societal 
development. The perception of these factors role in societal development is based on the 
conception of development, which dominates this thesis. The conception of development and theory 
of knowledge production dominating this thesis is established by linking dialectics with critical 
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realism based on works by Bertell Ollman et al., Brown et al and Ruth Groff. This will be 
elaborated and how the notion of development and theory of knowledge production relates to the 
theoretical framework constructed in the following theoretical chapter, the empirical foundation and 
the structuring of the analysis of the ontological field of study.     
Dialectical critical realism 
The transitive and intransitive dimensions  
Before accounting for the addition of dialectics to critical realism, we find it favorable for the 
understanding of the complete theory of science to outline the basic elements of critical realism. 
First and foremost, the most essential part of critical realism is the establishing of the transitive and 
intransitive dimension.  
The transitive dimension refers to the existing paradigms, theories, models and methods for 
scientific inquiry, which are in existence at a certain point in time. An important aspect of this 
transitive dimension is that existing knowledge is built on the foundations of previous knowledge 
both as a continuation of the previous and in some cases in an antagonistic relation to past 
experiences (Groff, 2004, p.3 ff.)  
Knowledge production is furthermore stressed by critical realists as being socially conditioned. That 
is that knowledge is produced in a concrete context which has influence on the produced 
knowledge. Knowledge is thus not produced secluded from the contemporary context and 
encompass this context in its emergence. This must not on the other hand be taken to mean that the 
production of knowledge is determined by the social context but on the other hand that knowledge 
serves to explore the social context i.e. contemporary society (Ibid. p. 26 ff.). The reason for this is 
that the intransitive dimension has precedence over the transitive dimension for critical realists.  
The intransitive dimension is the ontological aspect of critical realism i.e. the objects and 
phenomena that are the aim of academic inquiry. The intransitive dimension, or the contemporary 
world, exists whether or not it is acknowledged by researchers - being precedes thinking. This to an 
extent justifies our choice of researching informality and informal norms that are constitutive for 
social, economic and political development. Though difficult to research, we cannot deny the role 
of informality concerning the structures and relations in contemporary Zambia. We are as 
academics inspired to investigate the intransitive dimension based on the existing transitive 
dimension yet in the confrontation with the intransitive dimension the transitive dimension is 
challenged and evolves. The aspect of this interrelated character of the two dimensions is one of the 
prime reasons for the dialectic addition to critical realism which will be elaborated on.   
In this thesis, the theories of Mushtaq H. Khan, Douglass North and theories of informality and 
inclusive growth are discussed in order to establish an abstract framework which has been built on 
empirical research conducted by the above mentioned. This is our transitive dimension that enables 
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us to focus on key factors emphasized as being important by history in societal development. In the 
confrontation of this framework with the concrete ontological field of study we aim to point to 
relations in the Zambian political settlement that have the potential to act as a hindrance or 
advantage in achieving inclusive growth. By doing so, the thesis is beneficial for research about 
policy implementation in contemporary Zambia and gives insight into beneficial aims of reforms 
targeted at achieving inclusive growth.  
The domain of the empirical, the actual and the real 
This thesis is highly influenced by the critical realist perception of reality as being stratified and 
relationally differentiated. In order to explain this properly the three domains that constitute the 
ontology of critical realism becomes fundamental. The three domains are: The Empirical, which is 
the observed and experienced phenomena, the actual, all the phenomena that are occurring 
regardless of the researchers registering them, the real, that consist of the structures, forces, 
tendencies and mechanisms generating the phenomena and is thus the most important domain for 
academics conducting scientific research (Ibid. p. 16 f.). 
The stratification of reality mentioned above refers to the conception that reality is divided into 
different strata or levels concerning the three domains and that they function within different 
aspects of reality. This is important concerning this thesis because it is imperative that we as 
researchers are aware that the choice of phenomena or objects of our analysis are dependent upon 
our subjective context. The identified political settlement in Zambia is analyzed in its relation to the 
privatization of the copper mines and inclusive growth. This ought to lead us to a discovery of the 
real domain which is the relation between the different factors constituting the political settlement. 
Another focus than the political settlement identified in this thesis might lead to different results 
concerning the effects of the privatization of the mines and the pursuit of inclusive growth. The 
empirical thus function on a different level than the actual which can lead to different results about 
the real. Though the domains are subject to stratification they are highly interrelated which leads to 
the concept of relationally differentiation. 
The domain of the real contains mechanisms, structures, forces and tendencies that phenomena in 
the domain of the actual emerges from, the registered or experienced phenomena are then what 
forms the empirical (Ibid.). This shows a highly interrelated character of the different domains and 
in the thesis we argue that this inter-relation has a dialectical dimension in that phenomena has a 
retroactive effect upon the structures and mechanism that they emerge from. The interrelated 
character of the relations will be conceptualized in relation to this thesis from the perspective of 
emergence and the dialectical dimension in critical realism. 
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Emergence and Dialectics in critical realism 
The emergence of these societal phenomena based on the inter-relational character of the different 
domains presupposes an elaboration of this inter-relationality. In order to conduct this elaboration 
the linking of dialectics with critical realism becomes our point of reference.  
In short, emergence can be said to be indicative for the process in which societal phenomena come 
into existence based on the relation between structures and mechanisms and the reproduction of 
these. In other words emergence is the conceptualization of development within critical realism 
based on the above mentioned aspects of stratification and relational differentiation. Critical realism 
mechanisms and structures have inherent causal effects yet the manifestation of these causal effects 
are dependent on the relation to other structures and mechanisms (Creaven, 2002, p.131 ff.). 
Dialectics offer in this regard a beneficial elaboration of the nature of these relations and thus the 
process of the manifestation of societal phenomena.  
According to both critical realism and dialectics the structures and mechanisms that constitutes the 
domain of the real are in a constant process of manifesting causal effects in terms of societal 
phenomena. Yet an essential argument within dialectics is that the manifestation of the causal 
effects has a retroactive effect on the domain of the real (Séve, 2008, p.85 ff.). Both critical realism 
and dialectics have a non-linear perception of development due to this constant process of 
interrelated and reciprocal development. This further implies that societal processes are not 
determined by the presence of different structures and mechanisms. Instead, these processes are 
contingent to both the relations between the different domains, the inherent causal effects and the 
retroactive effects of the manifestations of the inherent causal effects within the different 
mechanisms and structures (Ibid.). This notion of the emergence of societal phenomena and 
development necessitates a high degree of contextualization of academic research. 
This thesis is highly influenced by this notion of development and the emergence of societal 
phenomena described above. This is reflected in our attempt to identify those structures, forces, 
tendencies and mechanisms with causal effects on the privatization of the Zambian copper mines, 
the pursue of inclusive growth and how these phenomena has had retroactive effects on these same 
underlying structures, forces, tendencies and mechanisms. 
Choice of theory 
The theory chosen for this project are the works of Mushtaq H. Khan, Douglass North and the 
concepts of inclusive growth and informality. The choice of Khan and North are made on the 
grounds of the philosophy of sciences described above. The ontology of Khan and North are the 
structures, forces, tendencies and mechanisms of central importance to societal development. Khan 
is highly motivated by the search for the inter-relational character of these structures and 
mechanisms in their manifestations as a political settlement and how this affects contemporary 
 6 
 
society. North is likewise concerned with the structures and mechanisms constituting the emergence 
of societal development and phenomena, however, North's approach is institutional and to a high 
degree inspired by the Western model of development. Though he incorporates the importance of 
institution, he still argues for a capitalist economic growth in the long-run. The open-access society 
model that North presents in NIE (New institutional economics) is very inspired by capitalism and 
competitive market. Khan on the other hand is focused on the specific relations between social, 
economic and political factors. Khan is more concerned about the “now”, though he also argues for 
industrialization, Khan views, growth (economic, social and political) as a product of the relations 
that are existing.  
Both Khan and North find the aspect of informality important and both contemplate the concepts' 
implications upon institutions, structures and the economy. In this thesis, the concept of informality 
is found highly relevant both concerning the institutions, structures and the economy but also in the 
relations between factors constituting societal development. The concept of informality is thus 
discussed on the basis of numerous works by different scholars and how the concept relates to the 
political settlement in Zambia is furthermore addressed throughout the analysis.  
The theoretical conception of inclusive growth is chosen on the basis of the emphasis of the concept 
by Zambian officials and the WB. The perception of inclusive growth is based on a critical 
perspective on the concept as it is addressed by the WB and James Hientz. The discussion of 
inclusive growth enables the use of the concept as a normative in line with different perspectives on 
development put forth by the Zambian government. 
 
Choice of empirical foundation for the thesis  
In this thesis, both quantitative data in the form of economic statistical material and qualitative 
material in the form of studies by other scholars and reports by the Zambian government and 
external organizations are used. By using both quantitative and qualitative empirical material, we 
are able to conduct a methodological triangulation which enables us to analyze our empirical data 
from different perspectives and thus consolidate the validity of the results produced in the thesis.  
The quantitative data has been collected through the data bank of the WB and then processed and 
analyzed in relation to the thesis. Concerning this empirical data, it has to be mentioned that the 
collection of the data by the WB and local officials are subject to both lack of resources and in 
many cases serves certain interests, which could have some influence on the data or choice of 
methods in collecting the data. The different reports and studies are also produced in a social 
context as mentioned in the philosophy of science, which has implications on the way the reports 
and studies present their ontology and choose the factors of importance for the ontological field of 
study.  
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Theory 
In the following chapter, we present the theoretical framework of the thesis. Our choice of theory is 
strongly related to the theory of science as explained in detail earlier. It is not chosen to adapt a 
preexisting theoretical framework instead, it is sought to critically construct one on the basis of a 
discussion of different approaches to state structures and development. The reason for this is that 
the theoretical framework is sought to be highly dominated by the ontological field of research. 
Societies and the development of these is a complex field of study because it entails a wide range of 
interrelated factors and actors. These factors and actors are highly relative in their manifestations 
which makes universal conceptualization near to impossible from a deductible point of departure. If 
one is to grasp the emergence of state structures and development one has to comprehend the 
concrete internal and external relations between factors and actors as they have evolved through 
time and in the context of an increasing globalized world (Harvey, 2006, p.69 ff.). This will be the 
aim of the thesis in the analysis but in order to structure this analysis the following theoretical 
chapter is necessary. The chapter serves to draw out the links between state structures, informality, 
new institutional economics and inclusive growth.  
 
Mushtaq H. Khan and the theory of political settlements 
Many scholars, the same as Khan, use the somewhat abstract term state capacity when trying to 
analyze state functions and the states' relation to economic development. State capacity is an 
expression of the efficiency of the state bureaucracy to measure if a state is well functioning or not. 
In the process of trying to answer the following question prevails. Does certain forms of governance 
require a certain state capacity? Or is it rather governance affecting state capacity positively or 
negatively? 
 
It is well known, from extensive experience, that we need a state in order to coordinate our 
activities and promote our welfare. Only the state, with its regulatory capacity, can furnish a 
number of services in general demand. In order to guarantee order, social peace, justice, and 
efficiency, society needs a functioning state. We need a state that works well—which does what it 
does in the right way, administratively speaking. But we also want a state that does the right things. 
By the latter we normally mean that the state conducts activities in accordance with the wishes of 
the citizenry. And the best way to ascertain the wishes of the citizenry is to apply the methods of 
political democracy. The ideal state, then, both functions well in an administrative sense and is 
democratic. Unfortunately, this combination has proved difficult to create (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008, 
p.1). 
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Khan argues that much standard institutional analysis assumes that governance agencies responsible 
for enforcing formal institutions have the power to enforce compliance. In contrast to this belief, 
Khan says that the success of enforcement and the cost of the enforcement depend on the strength 
of resistance to the enforcement of that particular institution. So, the more resistance the harder it is 
to implement and enforce the wanted formal institution (Khan, 2010, p.5). Knowing Khan‟s opinion 
on “standard” institutional analysis we use this theory in relation to the NIE theory that we also 
apply. Khan‟s theory is meant to both describe the relation between social, political and economic 
relations as well as a way for us to critically view the NIE approach. The study of the NIE approach 
is meant, among other things, to critically view Khan‟s approach as well.   
 
A central aspect to Khan is the question of informality, which will here be addressed shortly and 
further elaborated in its own sub-section of the theoretical chapter. Informal institutions can be 
described as informally organized political power that distributes benefits that cannot be distributed 
by formal institutions alone (Ibid. p. 25). The relation between the formal and informal groups, 
institutions and sectors is known as clientelist. Khan argues that most developing countries have 
such a political settlement. More specifically clientelism can be described as the exchange of goods 
and services for political support.  
 
Khan says that to achieve political stability in a society there has to be a consistent set of beliefs 
about the relative power or the different groups holding power and a distribution of benefits that are 
consistent with those beliefs (Ibid. p. 7). According to the report “For whom the windfalls”, there 
has been;  
Differing expectations about who should get what benefits from digging the wealth out 
of the ground” and that is “(…) causing serious tensions in the Copper belt region of 
Northern Zambia. Multinational copper-mining companies, the Zambian Government, 
workers and local communities all desperately want recently privatized copper mines 
to succeed, and for the region to return to its golden age as one of the most developed 
parts of Africa. Yet all have different beliefs about how to make it happen, and what 
rights and responsibilities should attach to private companies, the state and citizens 
(Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.1).  
 
Khan argues that the beliefs themselves are likely to be consistent across different groups if they are 
based on historical evidence of the outcomes of conflicts. The likelihood of a group achieving 
the distribution it wants depends on its ability to hold out in conflicts.  Engaging and holding out in  
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conflicts is costly. This gives us the concept of holding power, defined as the capability of an  
individual or group to engage and survive in conflicts. The greater the costs a group can impose  
on others, the greater the likelihood that other groups will abandon their attempts to get their 
preferred outcomes. Similarly, a group more able to absorb costs can survive longer in conflicts 
and is more likely to „win‟. Translating these observations into the context of institutions and  
governance, the enforcement of a particular institutional rule is likely to be more effective if the 
distribution of benefits under that institution is not contested by groups with holding power (Khan, 
2010, p.6). This observation is interesting when looking at the different groups and actors involved 
in the cobber mine industry, since they, according to the report, have different opinions on the 
distribution of benefits and therefore each groups contest groups with different opinions. Conflicts 
are likely to break out either when a group believes that the underlying distribution of power  
has changed and the distribution of benefits is not reflecting it, or if changes in distributions of 
benefits do not reflect the perceived distribution of power (Ibid. p. 7). Especially the latter 
observation seems to play an important role in our case, since, after the mines were privatized, there 
has been a change in the distributions of benefits that might not reflect the perceived distribution of 
power. Khan argues that conflicts end when the relevant groups accept a distribution of benefits 
as compatible with the distribution of power (Ibid.).  
 
Khan suggests, to begin with, a historical observation of the distribution of power in particular  
countries, and a look at how it has evolved using observable characteristics related to the 
organization of patron-client organizations. According to Khan, this can provide the basis for 
an analysis of important characteristics of the political settlement (Ibid.). 
 
Khan then divides his analysis into two levels. The higher level is the emergence of the social order. 
Without a social order, he states that the society will be in a state of violence or anarchy and in this 
state economic development is unlikely. For a social order to emerge there has to be a decline in 
violence and a minimal level of political stability. He says that as soon as social order emerges, the 
distribution of power will be embedded in institutions that can sustain it. He continues and say that 
some of these institutions may be formal, but also points out that in some developing countries 
formal institutions are not likely to “sustain the distributive requirements of all powerful groups”, 
and therefore there will be a variety of informal institutional arrangements as well which includes 
informal power in patron-client organizations. These informal organizations can help to achieve a 
defined political settlement if they generate distributions of benefits that bring the overall  
distribution of benefits closer into line with the distribution of power. Therefore, informal 
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institutions both reflect but also sustain the distribution of power by creating supportive benefits 
for powerful groups (Ibid. p. 8).  
Institutions are informal when there are no formal rules written down and enforced by formal 
(state) enforcement, but there are nevertheless „rules‟ that are systematic enough to be identified. 
There are a number of types of informal institutions. First, informal institutions can refer to patterns 
of behavior of individuals who are following internalized norms and values. An example would  
be an internalized norm of respect for property that may restrain individuals from appropriating 
assets owned by others even if the property rights are not well enforced. This type of informal 
institution is usually referred to in the NIE in explanations of why particular informal institutions  
may support the operation of particular formal institutions. For instance, the norm just referred 
to would lower the cost of enforcement of formal property rights significantly if the norm is 
widely accepted (Ibid. p. 10).  
 
Informality can also refer to rules that are not formally written down (or cannot be written down for 
political reasons) but which are nevertheless enforced by third parties who may formally be within 
the state but whose operations in any case rely on the  mobilization of informal power. Examples of 
informal enforcers would be the mafia or patron-client structures that may operate through a state or 
independently. The informal rule that jobseekers who come with a recommendation from the local  
mafia boss should be given the job is an informal institution of this type (Ibid.). 
 
Theory of informality 
In the discussion of Khan's theory of political settlements the concept of informality is touched 
upon briefly but we find as being of central importance to this thesis so the following section will 
address this concept in depth. This section of the thesis is an account of the use of the concept of 
informality in different perspectives in relation to the overall thesis. This is established through a 
critical debate about contemporary theory of informality. When considering economic development, 
the relations that constitute societal development and inclusive growth become central based on the 
above standing discussion of Khan's theories. The importance of societal relations is further 
grounded in our dialectical critical realist perspective on development where phenomena in 
contemporary Zambian society is seen as emanating from the relations between social, economic 
and political actors and institutions, and having a dialectical effect on these same structures.  
In a lot of aspects concerning informality in developing countries, in this current case Zambia, there 
is a need to look beyond a conceptualization of societal structures, institutions and relations 
between actors based on notions of these in a western context. A failure to recognize the importance 
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of the historical development of institutions, and actors in relation to them, leads to an 
underestimation at best of the influence externalities as i.e. multinational companies, bilateral-, 
international- and supranational organizations, and NGOs have and has had upon the societal 
development in many countries in the SSA region (Harvey, 2006, p.69 ff.). Furthermore it has to be 
mentioned that events in neighboring countries and international events are related to the process of 
development in many countries i.e. was the establishment of the very large informal shopping 
complex Eastleigh in Nairobi, Kenya, derived from the migration of Somalis into the complex in 
1910. This migration was both fostered by the contemporary situation in Somalia as well as the 
British involvement in the creation of the Mombase-Uganda railway which made the migration 
possible (Lochery, 2013). This perspective upon societal development being influenced by 
externalities will be brought into context of informality both in the regards to existing institutions 
and concerning relations between actors in society in the following.     
Development of theory of informality 
In the following section we establish how the concept of informality can be applied to the study of 
political settlements and societal development. This is sought in order to define the concept in 
relation to this thesis and operationalize it concerning the later analysis. In order to clarify the 
concept of informality it is beneficial to establish what it is not i.e. formality.  
The economy and the state have always been intrinsically linked for different reasons. Economic 
elites have always needed security concerning their affairs and protection of their property by a 
monopoly on violence provided by the state and the state has always needed the economic elite for 
the financing of its activities (Harvey, 2006, p.413 ff.). In order to secure these rights and interests 
of the economic elites a process of formalization has thus always taken place in the curse of 
economic development. This process of formalization can briefly be summarized as the judicial 
institutionalization of rights and interests (Campbell, 2006, pp.396-413). Formality can thus be 
conceptualized as institutions, actors, rights and interests, which has been manifested by law and 
will be treated as such in the following.  
This conceptualization is not established so as to then say that informality is everything formality is 
not. Such a dualistic approach would tend to stress the importance of formal capitalist development 
and thus underestimate the inter-relational and interdependent character of the formal/informal 
relationship (Potts, 2007, p.1 ff.). In this thesis, it will be argued that in many cases in SSA the 
formal economy is highly dependent on informal relations to political and social elites (i.e. relations 
that circumvent formal institutions and formal contracting). Furthermore, it is important to mention 
that a lot of spillover effects from the informal economy to the formal one might be observable and 
that the development of the formal economy thus depends on the informal economy (Sindzingre, 
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2006, p.5.8). An attempt to formalize the informal economy by way of direct reforms thus might 
have severe consequences for the formal economy.   
The concept of informality is often characterized by rather negative connotations such as shadowy, 
illegal, underground etc. There is of cause some grounds in this since criminal actions often fall 
within the area of the informal economy (Sindzingre, 2006, p.5.3). Yet in this thesis, we do not 
focus on crime and illegality but on the relations between the actors, institutions and structures, 
which constitute societal development. Informality will therefore in the following be seen in the 
relation to capitalist development and power structures not represented by formal judicial law. 
Informality in the SSA region in a historical perspective 
The historical development of systems and institutions is highlighted as being of great importance 
to the present by both Khan, North and in the methodological chapter of this thesis. In order to 
clarify why history matters the theory of uneven geographical development put forth by David 
Harvey is central. A key point in Marx´s study of capitalism which, was later taken up by Lenin in 
"Imperialism - the highest state of capitalism" is that capitalism has a tendency towards 
geographical expansion and internationalization. This geographical expansion has been addressed in 
length by David Harvey. Harvey explains how the internal contradiction in capitalism between the 
production and realization of surplus value drives capitalism towards compound growth and how 
this relates to the geographical expansion of the capitalist system (Harvey, 2006, p.69 ff.). This 
aspect is best understood through the application of the concept of scale. When the concept of scale 
is applied another contradiction appears between the interest of the individual capitalist and the 
system as a whole which is more applicable to the understanding of the geographical expansion of 
capitalism. The individual capitalist is due to the production of surplus value interested in paying as 
little as possible for the labor force applied in the production and extract as much labor as possible 
(efficiency). On the other hand, it is the worker who is the "tool", which creates the demand in the 
realization of the surplus value. The larger scale, in the form of the system as a whole, then has a 
conflicting interest with the individual capitalist concerning the amount of capital paid to the 
worker. This contradiction is only circumvented by maintaining compound growth and thus 
expanding the system geographically, (This is put in very simple terms and according to Harvey 
there are other mechanism which capitalism uses in order circumvent the contradictions inherent in 
the system as i.e. the expansion of credit so as to secure increasing demand).  
When one studies the state structures and development in SSA this can therefore not be regarded as 
isolated from the global historical processes. When much of Africa was colonized by European 
countries they brought with them institutional-, economic-, social-, religious-, political- etc. 
structures founded on western ideals. These imported aspects though similar in structures did not 
serve the same reproduction of power relations as they did in European countries at the time, but 
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was instead aimed at extracting value for the reproduction of power relations in the home countries. 
These imported and distorted structures became an integrated part of society in many countries in 
SSA even after decolonization and still serves as catalyst for conflicts and contradictions in present 
societies (Mcleod, 2002, p.26 ff.). 
Informal and formal societal relations  
Our aim of this thesis is not to engage in the discussion of the specific economic situation in 
Zambia but instead the character of the relations, which act as catalyst for the current economic 
situation and economic development, and the dialectic result of previous policy implementation. 
This approach will in later sections of the thesis be beneficial for the endeavor to recommend 
different policy approaches to inclusive growth. The reasons for this focus upon the constituting 
relations in the economy are numerous. First and foremost, a concrete empirical analysis of the 
informal economy is neither the aim of this thesis or statistically durable as explained in the 
methodological chapter (Sindzingre, 2006, p.5.9 ff.). Furthermore statistical accounts of informality 
is highly deductive because the way it is measured is by establishing causal linkages to the formal 
sector which is thought to be derived from phenomena in the informal sector. 
 
The most important point that has to be made in relation to formality/informality and societal 
relations is concerning the distribution of power. When mentioning the distribution of power it is 
founded on the previous mentioned theories by Mushtaq H. Khan. A stable political settlement is 
characterized in short by the distribution of economic benefits in line with the perceived distribution 
of power (Khan, 2010, p.60). In many cases in SSA, the state is barely able to maintain their 
monopoly on violence let alone securing investments in social aspects and infrastructure. This is 
thus maintained through informal contracting with informal networks as i.e. in Kenya where the 
Mungiki movement has taken over the distribution of clean water, transport and security in some 
areas around Nairobi because the state is lacking the ability to do so (Anderson, 2002 & Beal et. al. 
2011). The interrelated character of informal and formal institutions, actors and structures is 
particularly emphasized by the above mentioned example. Furthermore, it is stressed by Khan that 
the operation of formal institutions in many cases can depend on informal institutions, and these 
interdependencies turn out to be very important in securing the continuous functioning of the state 
and economy (Khan, 2010, p.10).  
 
Yet another point has to be made regarding this which is that once these informal networks has 
emerged with a role as a kind of pseudo state performing state functions this necessitates the 
distribution of benefits to these informal groups or structures which reproduces their holding power. 
This second point is especially important regarding external factors as well. This is due to the 
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necessity of foreign investors to establish relations to these informal networks and groups in order 
to conduct business. This is also contributing to the power of informal networks and can in the end 
have negative consequences for the fragility of the political settlement (Beall et al., 2011, p.18 ff.). 
 
New institutional economics 
The issue of ailing growth in many developing countries has been the center of economic and 
development research for decades. Though former economists turned to neo-classical economic 
theories for answers, later on, economists like Ronald Coase and Douglass North begun to advocate 
that, (neo) classical economic theories had to be combined with institution theory to fully 
comprehend why things worked differently in developing countries. As Douglass North clearly puts 
it; institutions “(…) extend economic theory by incorporating ideas and ideologies into the analysis, 
modeling the political process as a critical factor in the performance of economies, as the source of 
the diverse performance of economies, and as the explanation for "inefficient" (North, 1993, p.2) 
In this theoretical section of the paper, we will draw on North‟s research about institutions, 1) their 
role in society, 2) how they impact economic, political and social orders and 3) how they impact the 
level of openness and hence the society‟s ability to participate in the formal economy.   
A challenge in limited access societies, is that institutions are not necessarily created to be socially 
efficient but are created to serve the interest of elites and those with bargaining power to create new 
rules (Ibid. p. 3).  As he argues, before the neo-classic economic theories can be analyzed in these 
types of society, one must understand that, the market for example is being controlled by 
individuals and organizations with bargaining power, therefore, creating new institutional 
frameworks that will perpetuate their rents in the system (Ibid.).  With this in mind, North advises 
that, institutions must be looked at as critical constraints (by understanding transaction costs as the 
connection between institutions and production cost). Institutions and the understanding they give 
helps to extend economic theory by modeling “political process” as a critical factor for economic 
performance (Ibid.). 
According to North, there are three ways that humans structure the game to try to get a society to 
produce economic, political and social activity. Primitive social order: hunting and gathering 
societies, the limited access society (the natural state) and the open access
 
(North et al., 2009, pp.56-
59). 
The limited access society (the natural state) 
The limited access society is also referred to as the natural state because when you put people 
together in the face of continued violence; they tend to form a structure that is similar to the basic 
framework all over again. As North et al discuss in their paper, the “violent trap” can be used to 
analyze violence and its role in the political processes in society (Cox et al., 2013, pp.1,2). The 
 15 
 
violence trap can be analyzed as the incumbent elites‟ desire to maintain the status quo. For 
example political, social/religious and economics elites will join together to protect each other‟s 
rents. Competition ensures that, the rents that are observed in limited access societies are temporary 
and eliminated over time because if we have rents that are making for very high rates of return 
whether politically, economically or socially, it will be in the interest of other members of the 
society to participate. Economic elites will support political elites in order to eliminate threat from 
competition for them to gain monopoly. All elites stand to gain by cooperating with other elites in 
order to protect each other‟s rents in return of an interdependent structure; they maintain some 
stability, a modest amount of economic growth and ways to maintain their privileges (Ibid. p. 3). 
From this observation, Cox et al, identify that, the violence trap can be argued to be one of the 
reasons why it is difficult to undertake reforms in limited access societies. Because in most cases, 
these reforms are not in the interest of the elites but rather an opportunity that could lead to 
inclusiveness of more actors in the formal state (Ibid. p. 2). To further enforce this Cox discuss that 
even the richest countries have had to deal with violence traps in order to make the transition from 
limited access to open access societies so that not only a part of the population is part of the elite 
and the rest “second class citizens”. In a critical light this observation show some conditions 
regarding the limited access societies in sub Saharan Africa that need to be addressed: many of 
them have gone through violent reforms to gain their independence, how come those reforms did 
not lead to any radical changes in the social, political and economic order in such societies? In 
another report by (Ober & Weingast, 2013), the approach that development is “uniquely modern” is 
discussed which leads us to a more historic approach to development and hence ask the question of 
how long after the “violent reforms” and “chaos” can societies begin to make the transition to open 
access societies?  
Open Access societies 
Open access societies constitute about 15-20% of the world‟s population and have only been seen in 
the last 200 years
2
 (North et al., 2009, p.56). One of the key features of open-access communities is 
competition, both in political and economic markets. This is important because according to North 
et al, political, social and economic development are all complementary to each other and in fact are 
inseparable (Cox et al., 2013, p.4). The rule of law determines the dynamics of this kind of society. 
It does not matter who you are, rules apply to everyone, impersonal exchange and property rights 
that are defined apply to everyone and not just the elite in open-access. Rule of law and property 
rights are the rules of the game. Open access societies require that most of the society become 
participants, hence inclusiveness is also an important characteristic of this society (North, 1993) 
                                                 
2
 Though Ober et al argue that in Ancient Athens, there were social orders that were fueled by “commerce and 
production” rather than personal exchanges (Ober & Weingast, 2013, p.6). 
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(North et al., 2009). We criticize North‟s approach regarding the relations between political, 
economic and social development. We agree that, they are inseparable but we do not agree that they 
are always complementary.  
The transition from natural state/limited-access to open-access society 
North et al outlined three doorstep conditions that characterize the transition from limited access to 
an equal access (open access) society. 
1. Elites in their own self-interests will increase property rights to more and more people to increase 
the rents that they get i.e. expansion of economic activity to increase rents. For this to happen, 
coalition groups must create institutions that make impersonal exchanges more beneficial to elites. 
The point is to get the self-interests of the elite to expand impersonal relationships to institutionalize 
open access for all (North et al., 2009, p.64) 
2. In order to achieve the first step, there is a need to create institutions and organizations that are 
out of the reach of government (so far, institutions created are creatures of government and do not 
exist without the support of government). To get the advantages of the wider market, we need to 
create organizations that can take advantage of new opportunities. For example, France, 
Netherlands, England in the 15
th
, 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries; observed the opportunities from overseas 
trade to begin with, the governments created monopolies that went out and extended overseas trade. 
Overtime however, these companies found it in their advantage and began to seek autonomy 
independent of government control and eventually they gained the rights to establish themselves 
independently. Eventually, the organizations and institutions created will prefer to operate 
independently to take advantage of the increasing trade opportunities (Ibid. p. 64). Hence, this could 
be an explanation of why previous development agendas drawn for developing countries by the 
IMF required privatization so they could operate independently as experiential in the case of 
Zambia. 
3. In order to prevent violence in limited access societies, the military has to be part of the elite 
group and there has to be cooperation between elite groups including the military in providing 
stability at home and preventing violence from outside. In open access societies, the military is 
subservient to the population, unlike in some examples like Latin America where the elite uses the 
military to suppress the people (Ibid.).  
The process of going from a limited access to an open access society is not just about changing the 
rules, you have to change the whole way the society works. There has to be a lower cost of 
transaction by encouraging cooperation from a wider audience. This cooperation must be 
complementary to the rule of law. Rule of law does not simply work by imposing it, there has to be 
“new informal norms of behavior” that are complementary to the rule of law in order to sustain rule 
of law (Ibid. p. 58).   
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According to North, in open access societies, there are enormous markets, that operate independent 
of government activities and they require that there are low costs of transaction, which is not 
possible unless you extend and develop a degree of cooperative behavior that is a necessary 
condition as a part of this process. 1) Hence, the process of transformation requires the extension of 
citizenship to a wider part of the population. 2) Build complex markets for people to learn to deal 
and exchange on a non-personal level.  
If the process is this simple then why do many countries face the challenge of making the transition 
from limited to open access-society? It seems that in many limited-access societies, making the 
transition to open-access equates a disruption of the existing system. The trap however is that, when 
we destroy the very thing that makes for stability and prevents violence i.e. the structure of 
interdependence of elites groups in limited access societies there is a breakdown and a state of 
disorder. When the structure that is designed to keep rents around break down without replacing it 
with something new, then we end up with a world of chaos (Ibid.) (Cox et al., 2013). 
We are critical of the steps that North, outlines as the process of transitioning from limited access to 
open access. Firstly, this process takes time, which he does not really address. The western societies 
who have made this transition had at some point also had to be faced with challenges of growth and 
informality for centuries before they became open access societies. These structures were actually, 
to a large extend, created in the different colonies by Western states as mentioned in the section 
“theory of informality”. Secondly, he mentions overseas growth, but we are critical of this as well 
because the current power structures of the world do not support this. In the 15
th
, 16
th
, 17
th
 
centuries, Europeans went to Africa, Asian and South America in pursuit of economic wealth, 
however, we argue the conditions and power structures in the global economy today do not support 
this form of economic expansion. 
Inclusive Growth  
The World Bank on inclusive growth  
Instead of just focusing on economic development we aim to emphasize the interrelated character of 
development and thus analyze the relations between actors, institutions and structures in society 
both concerning economic, political and social factors of origin. The following section is therefore 
included in order for us to discuss a perspective on development and growth, which is in line with 
the theories presented above.  
In the paper “What is inclusive growth”, the WB defines and clarifies the term inclusive growth. 
The institution states that inclusive growth is often interchangeably linked to other terms like 
„broad-based growth‟, „shared growth‟, and „pro-poor growth‟. The WB explains that inclusive 
growth is an analytical way of focusing both on pace and pattern of economic growth to “identify 
and prioritize the country-specific constraints to sustained and inclusive growth”. The method 
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focuses on both poverty and growth, which is usually analyzed separately (The World Bank, 2009, 
p.1).  
The purpose of the inclusive growth approach is, according to the WB, to see a “rapid and sustained 
poverty reduction” which “requires inclusive growth that allows people to contribute to and benefit 
from economic growth”. Inclusive growth, as mentioned, refers to the pace and pattern of growth, 
which are considered, interlinked, and therefore should be addressed together. The idea is that both 
the pace and pattern of growth are considered critical for reaching a high, sustainable growth 
record, as well as poverty reduction (Ibid.). 
The WB continues, and argues that for growth to be sustainable in the long run, it should be “broad-
based” across sectors, and inclusive of the large part of the country‟s labor force. In this definition 
the WB, see that inclusive growth implies a direct link between macro and micro determinants of 
growth and points to the importance of “structural transformation for economic diversification and 
competition” (Ibid. p. 2). 
More specifically inclusive growth focuses on “productive employment rather than on direct 
income redistribution, as a means of increasing incomes for excluded groups” (Ibid.). This is 
because it can be difficult to impose bigger burdens on already low budgets, and therefore it is, 
according to the WB‟s definition of inclusive growth, “impossible to reduce poverty through 
redistribution in countries where average income falls below US$ 700 per year” (Ibid.). Therefore, 
inclusive growth is about “raising the pace of growth, enlarging the size of the economy, while 
leveling the playing field for investment, and increasing productive employment opportunities” 
(Ibid. p. 3). It has to be mentioned that these quotations are based on the strict focus on the role of 
the free market and private businesses that is dominating the WB. In many cases there can be a lot 
of wealthy individuals in society even though the average income is low and therefore the average 
income indicator is misleading and therefore inadequate when deciding whether or not use the 
inclusive growth approach. A progressive taxation system would in a case where the average 
income is low and a few individuals wealthy be able to effect poverty reduction. The last quotation 
is again a reflection of the theoretical perspectives in the WB where private businesses are seen as 
the engine of growth and in creating productive employment opportunities. The state on the other 
hand is unable to function as an agent in the free-market because of the social and political 
considerations of the state and are thus perceived as unproductive and inefficient. This leads the 
WB to the logical conclusion of emphasizing privatization and deregulation in the context of 
economic development. 
The idea is that the most important thing for inclusive growth is productive employment, because it 
will create new jobs and income for the individual, while productivity growth can lift wages of the 
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employed. The ability of people being productively employed depends on the opportunity to fully 
use available resources as the economy evolves over time (Ibid. p. 11).  
When applying inclusive growth, the analysis should therefore look at ways to strengthen the 
productive resources and the capacity of the individual on the labor side, but also look at ways to 
open new opportunities for productive employment on the labor demand side (Ibid.).  
Pro-poor growth is another term used when discussing inclusive growth, but, according to the WB, 
where pro-poor growth mainly focuses on the welfare of the poor, the approach of inclusive growth 
focuses more on the “opportunities for the majority of the labor force, the poor and the middleclass 
alike”. A report made by the commission on growth and development in 20083, the WB notes that 
inclusiveness is a concept that “encompasses equity, equality of opportunity, and protection in 
market and employment transitions” (Ibid. p. 2). Furthermore, it has to “emphasize the idea of 
equality of opportunity in terms of access to markets, resources, and unbiased regulatory 
environment for businesses and individuals” (Ibid.). 
In short – to the WB inclusive growth is: 
- IG focuses on economic growth, which is a necessary and crucial condition for poverty 
reduction.  
- IG adopts a long-term perspective and is concerned with sustained growth.  
o (a) For growth to be sustained in the long run, it should be broad-based across sectors. 
Issues of structural transformation for economic diversification therefore take a front 
stage. Some countries may be an exception and continue to specialize as they 
develop due to their specific conditions (e.g. small states).  
o (b) It should also be inclusive of the large part of the country‟s labor force, where 
inclusiveness refers to equality of opportunity in terms of access to markets, 
resources and unbiased regulatory environment for businesses and individuals.  
- IG focuses on both the pace and pattern of growth. How growth is generated is critical for 
accelerating poverty reduction, and any IG strategies must be tailored to country-specific 
circumstances.  
- IG focuses on productive employment rather than income redistribution. Hence the focus is 
not only on employment growth but also on productivity growth.  
- IG has not only the firm, but also the individual as the subject of analysis.  
- IG is in line with the absolute definition of pro-poor growth, not the relative one4.  
                                                 
3
 Report made by the commission on growth and development in 2008 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6507/449860PUB0Box3101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.p
df?sequence=1 (05.06.14, kl. 14.07) 
4
 The absolute definition, growth is considered to be pro-poor as long as poor people benefit in absolute terms, whereas 
in the relative definition, growth is “pro-poor” if and only if the incomes of poor people grow faster  
than those of the population as a whole, i.e., inequality declines.  
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- IG is not defined in terms of specific targets such as employment generation or income 
distribution. These are potential outcomes, not specific goals.  
- IG is typically fueled by market-driven sources of growth with the government playing a 
facilitating role. (Ibid. p. 4).  
 
The WB suggests that a country that has seen rapid economic growth over at least ten years, but not 
seen substantial reduction in poverty rates, could focus more specifically on the inclusiveness of the 
growth strategies. I.e. the equality of opportunity for individuals and firms (Ibid.). The WB also 
refers to another example from resource-rich countries, like Zambia, where extractive industries 
usually do not employ much labor and the “non-resource sectors typically suffer contractions 
associated with Dutch disease
5
 effects during boom periods” (Ibid. p. 5). Furthermore, the WB 
propose that for countries starting at a very low income level and low growth, an inclusive growth 
approach could be close to an approach for “speeding up the pace of growth, as a main focus should 
be in getting the fundamentals for growth right” (Ibid.).  Referring to Lopez and Servén (2004) the 
WB draws attention to the importance of growth, when suggesting that the poorer a country is, the 
more important growth is as a component in explaining poverty reduction (Ibid.). 
Since the inclusive growth approach takes a longer term perspective it is, according to the WB, 
important to “recognize the time lag between reforms and outcomes” (Ibid.).  
Heintz on inclusive growth  
James Heintz points out some issues with the current inclusive growth definition. He argues that 
widespread informality concerning employment, enterprises, and productive activities can limit 
inclusive growth and poverty reduction. In this sense, informality is characteristic for developing 
economies and their chance for implementing inclusive policies. Even though many recognize this, 
there is still not consensus on what policies are appropriate to make growth more inclusive when 
economies are also characterized by widespread informality (Heintz, 2012, p.4).  
As mentioned before employment represents one of the most important channels where people 
participate in the economy and through that the economic benefits of growth are distributed to 
individuals and households. Informality is seen as the outcome of decisions made in the face of 
structural constraints that limit choice and these constraints represent a barrier to inclusive growth 
(Ibid. p. 16). 
                                                 
5
 . If the supply response or absorptive capacity is limited in the rest of the economy, the resource windfalls may induce 
a rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate, a loss of competitiveness in the non-resource export sector, 
deindustrialization of the traditional sectors, and poorer growth prospects overall for the economy. These potential 
harmful effects were labeled as “Dutch disease” when they were noticed in Netherlands after the discovery of North Sea 
gas. (Delfin S. Go et al., 2013, p. 2.3) http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/11/06/000158349_20131106150311/Rendered/PDF/W
PS6691.pdf  
 21 
 
Heintz presents a possible way of evaluating how issues around informality can be integrated into 
development policy and research by determining to what extent “(…) access to social and legal 
protections represents a primary constraint on the ability of individuals to participate in and benefit 
from productive activities” (Ibid.). He does point to the fact though, that, informality in some 
situations also can contribute to the severity of other constraints, rather than representing “a distinct, 
separable constraint” (Ibid.). He gives the example that access to finance can be a constraint for 
many small-scale enterprises, and informality could limit access even further (e.g. due to lack of 
formal accounts, a reliable credit history, or legal rights to land). According to Heintz, the real 
barrier, in this example, to improving livelihoods is exclusion from the services of financial 
institutions. The solution should therefore involve finding means of providing informal enterprises 
access to credit, instead of automatically focusing on informality. Part of this solution may involve 
creating new institutions, relationships, and practices that by their existence make informal 
enterprises more formal (Ibid. p. 17). 
Heintz believe that individuals do make purposeful choices about their employment, taking into 
account “household dynamics in addition to individual preferences”. But the choices are made 
subject to a series of constraints. He says, “individuals with different endowments of wealth, 
income, education, information, and social connections face different constraints. Responsibility for 
dependents, both in terms of income support and nonmarket labor, imposes constraints on 
employment choices” (Ibid.). 
Inappropriate labor market institutions can also inflict, rather than relax constraints. According to 
Heintz, the primary challenge here is not to determine whether informal employment is voluntary or 
freely chosen. Instead, it is to “identify the binding constraints on employment choices and to 
develop policies that relax these constraints and improve employment outcomes”. He does elaborate 
and say that relaxing constraints on individual choice is not enough. Say if an individual were free 
to choose between formal and informal employment, and decided to work informally. That does not 
mean that the informal job is a good job – it only tells that it is preferable to the other options 
available. In this sense, quality of choices also matters and therefore inclusive growth should not 
only seek to expand the number of choices available to individuals, but also the quality of those 
choices (Ibid.).  
Heintz describes how the concept of inclusive growth requires analysis of how employment 
opportunities rise and change with the growth process. As mentioned before, economic growth can 
sometimes be accompanied by an increase in informal employment. Because for some kinds of 
informal employment - e.g. informal wage employment or subcontracted self-employment - 
informality may actually support growth by reducing labor costs and improving competitiveness. 
Contrary to this, Heintz points to the risk of stopping growth since a “concentration of a large 
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proportion of an economy's human resources in activities with low levels of productivity and dismal 
earnings will put the brakes on growth”. He explains that in a situation like that the challenge is to 
“move labour out of low-quality employment into more productive activities.” The aim is to 
“develop policies which facilitate a more productive use of human resources in a way which 
expands the degree and quality of employment choices available to individuals” (Ibid.). Moreover, 
he says:  
To the extent that exclusion from social protections and legal rights limit choices and 
mobility, a reduction in the proportion of people informally employed would constitute 
an important element of an employment-focused approach to inclusive growth. 
However, this does not suggest that 'formalization' must be a distinct policy goal 
within an inclusive growth agenda, even if informal employment decreases as a 
consequence of making growth more inclusive (Ibid. p. 18). 
Sub-conclusion  
The different theoretical perspectives are not necessarily compatible and can at times have 
contrasting conceptions of development, institutions, history etc. The aim of this thesis though is 
not to adapt a preexisting framework for the study of political settlements and development. Instead 
it is sought to draw on preexisting theory in order to establish a framework that allows for an in 
depth analysis with attention to details emphasized as important in the above mentioned and which 
is open to the complex character of the ontological field of study.  
There are fundamental differences between Mushtaq H. Khan's and Douglass North's analysis of 
institutions and their role in society. Where Khan sees institutions as emanating from the relations 
between factors in the political settlement and thus has a rather relativistic and contextualized 
approach to his studies North tends to analyze institutions from a western idealistic approach. In the 
thesis the standpoint of Khan will be applied mostly but the formalization process inherent in 
North's perspective on institutions will also play a fundamental role in the study of the development 
of informal movements, groups and structures. It has to be mentioned that Khan's focus on elites 
concerning the political settlement and development will be contested by empirical findings of 
social and political change stemming from bottom-up movements. 
Due to the focus on inclusive growth by both the Zambian government and the WB, we find it 
important to address the approach in the thesis. The broad-based focus on both social and economic 
development is initially positive and somewhat in line with Khan‟s theoretical perspectives.  
A challenge when using the inclusive growth approach though is the lack if contextuality and 
acknowledgement of contemporary effects of historical development. Furthermore, it can be seen as 
a problem that the approach does not take into account the possibility of a weak state capacity that 
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might not be able to implement the approach and maintain the long-term perspective as many 
developing countries go through radical transitions, different political settlements and turmoil.  
Based on the theoretical discussions the focus of the analysis will primarily be on the historical 
development of social, political and economic factors in Zambian society and how this development 
has created the foundation for the emergence of the contemporary political settlement. In order to 
properly asses this, we also analyze the emergence of the relations between the different factors in 
relation to contemporary societal phenomena. This is done to analyze the causes and effects of the 
privatization of the mining sector in Zambia and how this has affected the political settlement and 
its ability to pursue inclusive growth.  
Based on the previous discussion theoretical key points has to be emphasized in regards to the 
theoretical framework applied in the analysis of this thesis: 
- The aspect of informality both in regards to societal relations and the informal character of 
different social, economic and political factors 
- The distribution of benefits and the perceived distribution of power  
- Perspectives on formalization of informal movements, rules and structures 
- Institutions and the role of institutions in relation to state fragility 
- The aspect of economic growth in relation to inclusive growth 
- Social development in relation to inclusive growth 
- The historical aspect of social, political and economic factors 
- The implications of external factors 
- Patron-client relations 
Analytical preface  
The Zambian economy and economic factors 
In the following, we analyze the economy of Zambia and important economic factors. This will 
enable us to more substantially analyze the relation between the economy, the political and social 
relations of the Zambian society. According to Khan, it is necessary for a political settlement that 
the perceived distribution of economic benefits matches the perceived distribution of power. The 
following chapter on the economy of Zambia thus enables us to say something about the 
distribution of economic benefits and the state and development of the Zambian economy.  
Economists would argue that the growth of GDP can be seen as the indicator of the overall 
economic development of a country. In the following, we will elaborate the scope of analyzing 
economic development by several other factors and in the analysis relate the aspect of economic 
development to social and political factors. It has to be noted that some empirical data is missing. 
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This is shown in the figures when the variables suddenly has the value 0. Furthermore, data on the 
poverty and debt situation was sought but unfortunately not found.  
Figure 1 - GDP (constant 2005 US$) 
 
Source : http://databank.worldbank.org/. 
Based on GDP, the outlook for the Zambian Economy can be seen as very positive yet in order to 
secure the economic development linkages and spillovers from the high-profit generating aspects of 
the economy has made to other sectors of the economy. That could support the development of 
infrastructure and social aspects (See chapter on inclusive growth). Different aspects of the 
Zambian economy will be analyzed in order to establish whether these linkages and spillovers has 
taken place. 
The shift in tendencies concerning the service sector and the industrial sector is occurring at the 
same time as Zambia receives financial support from IMF with accompanying reforms.  
The changes in the industry sector could be explained by investment patterns. One of Kaunda‟s 
arguments for nationalization of the privately owned mines was that they did not receive enough 
investments. In the early period of nationalization the flows of investments into the mines were 
good, this however changed when copper prices fell and for the remainder of the nationalized 
period investments were low. Subsequently equipment wore down, production costs rose and 
production output fell. After privatization massive inflows of foreign direct investment into the 
mining sector have restored production levels (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, pp.7-8, 19) (Zambia 
Development Agency, 2013, p.3). This emphasizes Zambia's dependency on copper since the low 
copper prices can be said to be the reason why the state was forced to privatize since they could not 
maintain the sector with falling prices. 
The fluctuations in the service sector coincide with the introductions of Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP). The receding tendency from 1983 until 1986 and 1989-1993 coincides with the 
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first and second SAP. From early 1987 until mid-1989, the government temporarily broke away 
from the SAP and rolled back the reforms. SAP introduced trade liberalizations, removal of price 
controls and restrictions on public expenditures. Services that relied on the earlier protection would 
henceforth have trouble and restrictions on government services, wages and subsidies also played a 
role in this declining tendency. There is a small peak in 1987, which may be due to the short-term 
retraction of SAP reforms (Situmbeko & Zulu, 2004). The massive increase in 1994 and subsequent 
declining tendency is related to growth in the service industry; sections of „wholesale and retail 
trade‟, „transport and communication‟, financial institutions and „real estates and business‟. The 
growth trends were triggered by an increase in investment (foreign and domestic) after the 
liberalization of 1991 and following privatization of government enterprises (CUTS CITEE, 2008, 
p.1)  
Figure 2 - Contribution to GDP by main sectors (as % of GDP) 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/. 
As seen in figure 2, the agricultural sector is not as significant a contributor in terms of value added 
to GDP compared to the service- and industry sector. The low value added by the agricultural sector 
has to be seen in relation to figure 3 and 4, which show that the vast majority of the workforce is 
employed in agriculture this is an indication of widespread subsistence farming. The fact that the 
amount of people employed in the sector rises from 1990 and 2005 coinciding with less people 
being employed in the industrial sector is an indication of a lack of spillover effects from the copper 
production and problems concerning industrial transformation. 
Figures 3 & 4 - Employment in main sectors in 1990 and 2005 (as % of total work force) 
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Figure 3 - Employment in main sectors for 1990                           Figure 4 - Employment in main sectors for 2005 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/. 
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Figure 5 - FDI inflows (in current US$) 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/. 
The slow rising increase in FDI from 1992 is probably a result from the liberalization and 
privatization process. The increasing tendency from 2005 seems to parallel the rise, brief fall and 
subsequent rise in copper prices. It is likely that the rise in copper prices has facilitated extra 
incentive for investment and the short-term fall in prices made investors pause investments. The 
short-term dip in copper prices in 2008-2009 was due to the global financial crisis (MSU, NA). It is 
not clear if the drop in FDI is a product of drop in copper prices, due to the financial crisis or an 
effect of both.  
Figure 6 - Copper prices per ton from 1961-2012 (in constant 98 US$) 
 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey, 2014, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/historical-statistics/. 
Figure 6 shows the development of copper prices from 1961-2012. Copper accounted for almost 
80% of Zambia's total export (UNECA, 2013) and the above standing figure on the development of 
copper prices is therefore important in the study of the Zambian economy. As shown in previous 
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figures the production of ores and minerals are of central importance to the Zambian economy. Of 
these ores and minerals the most significant resource is copper (Central Intellegence Agency, n.d.).  
Figure 7 - Merchandise exports (current US $) 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
The figure above shows the development in exports of merchandise and will be analyzed in relation 
to figure 8. In this figure, it can be observed how exports have remained at an almost constant level 
from 1960-2002. In 2002, there is a significant rise in exports until 2008 where a momentary fall 
can be observed until 2009 after which a significant rise continues until the present. 
Figure 8 shows the export of different products from Zambia. It shows how the export of ores and 
metals from 1966 to 1979 constitute almost 100% of total merchandise exports. From 1993 to 1999, 
a falling tendency can be seen in regards to the shares of ores and metals in total export. In 2000, a 
momentary rise can be observed but it diminishes again by around 11% from 2001 to 2004. From 
2004 to 2006 the shares of ores and metals in total export rises with around 21% and from 2006 
until the present it fluctuates between 80-85%.The export of Foods, agricultural raw materials and 
manufactures remains insignificant in their share of total exports from 1966 to 1994 but they all 
increase in their share of total exports from 1994 to 2003/2004. From 2004 and to the present food 
and manufacture exports remains at 7-10%. Agricultural raw material exports on the other hand 
diminishes to almost 0% from 2004 to the present. The export of fuels remains constantly close to 
0% from 1966-2011.  
The steep rise in exports shown in figure 7 can be said to represent a significant increase in the 
export of ores and metals from 2004-2012 if this is seen in relation to figure 8. The share of ores 
and metals in total merchandise exports remain high during the general increase in merchandise 
exports. 
Figure 8 - Export from main sectors (as % of total merchandise export) 
 29 
 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
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Figure 9 - Import from main merchandises (as % of total merchandise imports) 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
From figure 10 shown above it becomes clear that the primary merchandise import is manufactures 
which has fluctuated between 60-80% from 1966-2011. The low degree of agricultural imports is 
explained by the vast number engaged in subsistence farming. The high degree of manufactures 
imports is an indication of a small domestic industry which is another indication of the lack of 
spillovers from the copper mining industry to other parts of the economy.  
Figure 10 - Inflation (in annual %) 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/. 
Figure 7 shows the inflation in Zambia from 1961-2012. This figure is included in order to better 
analyze the following figures where the value is in current US $ instead of constant values. The 
only really significant period in the above standing figure is between 1984 and 1996. Although a 
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significant decrease in inflation can be observed in 1988 this period is characterized by a very high 
rate of inflation which peaks in 1992 with 165,5%. 
Figure 11 - Tax revenue (in local currency) 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
From the figure 11 it becomes apparent that the tax revenue of the Zambian government has been 
rising exponentially since 1990 and especially radical since the turn of the millennia. This coincides 
with the rising GDP shown in figure 1, the significant rise in FDI net inflows (figure 5) and rising 
merchandise export (figure 8). It should be noted that previous income from parastatal companies 
are not presented in this figure because it is not accounted for as tax revenue. In figure 12 shown 
below the different taxes as they contribute to the total tax revenue are displayed. The overall shift 
away from taxes on goods and services and international trade and the focus on taxes on income, 
profits and capital gains is very beneficial to MNCs and large companies. The largest companies 
and MNCs are to a large extend located within free-trade zones and have favorable tax-exemption 
contracts. In short, this development is moving the tax-burden away from large companies and 
MNCs and places it on individuals and small-scale companies instead. The fact that this 
development can be observed since 1995 could be an indication of the derived effect from the SAP 
agreements in 1995 with the IMF.  
Figure 12 - Taxes on main areas (as % of total revenue) 
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Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
Sub conclusion 
Based on the analysis of the Zambian economy it we dare to say, that Zambia in the last decade has 
experienced a high degree of growth in GDP. This growth is clearly based on the mining sector and 
primarily copper production. The dependency upon the copper sector can be seen as an indication of 
the Dutch disease described earlier as the employment in the industrial sector has been shown to 
decrease from 1990-2005. Furthermore, the benefits generated in the mining sector has apparently 
not created the desired spillover effects and industrial transformation, which is essential to the 
inclusive growth approach. The mono-export of copper which drives the economic growth is in the 
hands of privatized companies that do not pay any significant amount of taxes. This inhibits the 
possibility to channel profits from the copper production into the upgrading of infrastructure and 
social aspects such as schools, sanitation, healthcare and education required to upgrade the 
workforce which is a basic need in pursuing industrial transformation. This mono-export of copper 
furthermore makes the Zambian economy dependent on the price fluctuations in the copper prices 
as shown in the overlap of GDP with the prices on copper. From 1990-2005 there is a significant 
tendency showing that a large part of the workforce has been pushed out of employment in the 
industrial- and service sector and into subsistence farming. 
Though, a vast increase in GDP has been shown for the last decade many negative tendencies 
concerning the achievement and maintenance of inclusive growth has also been found such as lack 
of spillovers from the mining industry, a tendency for mono-export of copper and lack industrial 
transformation. These negative tendencies coincides with the IMF engagement in Zambia and the 
implementation of SAPs.  
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Analysis 
Analysis part 1  
Historical and political development and analysis of political, economic and social relations in 
Zambia before and after the copper mine privatization 
Every country is a product of its past, and for us to analyze the effect on various relations in Zambia 
after the privatization, we must know about the relations before the privatization. This approach is 
in accordance with Khan, who, as mentioned in our theory section, suggests a, 
“historical observation of the distribution of power in particular countries, and a 
look at how it has evolved using observable characteristics related to the organization of patron 
client organizations”. According to Khan, this can “provide the basis for an analysis of important 
characteristics of the political settlement”.  
 
It will appear that Khan‟s theory serves as a tool in regards to understanding the political and socio-
political relations before and after the privatization of the copper mines. In relation to the economic 
relations, Khan and NIE as well as respectively the WB´s and Heintz inclusive growth approach 
will inspire this part of the analysis. Furthermore, the theoretical discussion of informality included 
to elaborate the practice of elite bargaining and tribal balancing.  
 
Focusing on pre-privatization conditions, this section functions both as an overview of the relations 
constituting the Zambian state after independence and as an analysis of the effects of the relations 
relevant to our second part of the analysis focusing on the privatization and after. It will be clear 
that the copper industry is important from the beginning of independence (and even before), as well 
as what is known as elite bargaining or tribal balancing has played and still plays a significant role 
in the political environment why the two subjects will be of specific interest to the analysis both 
before and after privatization. The nationalization of many companies are also very significant to 
the economic development in Zambia‟s pre-privatization history and therefore we take a close look 
at this in the first section.  
 
Zambia gained its independence on the 24th of October in 1964 from the British Empire and 
Kenneth Kaunda became prime minister and later president of the country with his party United 
National Independence Party (UNIP). Up until 1972 the country, The first Republic of Zambia, had 
a constitution that allowed for multiparty competition, but this was amended in order to provide a 
“one-party participatory democracy“ and the Second Republic  was initiated in 1973 by Kaunda and 
UNIP who held power in both periods (Tordoff, 1974, p.1). In 1991, the Third Republic was 
initiated and a new party, the Movement for Multiparty Development (MMD) was elected for 
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government. MMD held power until 2011 when Patriotic Front (PF) won elections with Michael 
Sata taking over presidency. 
  
 
The political relations in Zambia – the First Republic  
Of important pre-independence events, relating to the future construction of political relations, to be 
mentioned, is the role of the Cha Cha Cha campaign in 1961, which was a result of rural protests 
over unpopular taxes and agricultural regulations imposed by the colonizers. Ultimately, the 
campaign contributed greatly to the success of the independence in 1964. This later gave problems 
to Kaunda and his government. On the one hand, UNIP was committed to develop rural areas but 
could only do so, by keeping some of the taxes and regulations that the former colonizers had 
enforced. On the other hand, after achieving independence, the political leaders and their supporters 
who had initiated the protest that played such a big role in the success of the independence later on, 
but whom had initiated the protest because of the taxes and regulations, now expected their reward. 
This in the end led to the lapse of some regulations, such as agricultural, because the local UNIP 
officials would not enforce them (Ibid. p. 15). Here Khan‟s observation in regards to the power of 
enforcement is justified, when he says “that the success of enforcement and the cost of the 
enforcement depend on the strength of resistance to the enforcement of that particular institution. 
So, the more resistance the harder it is to implement and enforce the wanted formal institution” 
which is often neglected in other state capacity analysis. From the beginning, Kaunda was 
challenged but it will appear as we go through the analysis, that he for many years achieved peace 
in Zambia among other things because of his ability to balance the interests of different elite groups, 
the people and traditional leaders.  
The fact that the colonists had ruled indirectly through local chiefs lead to the tribalization of local 
authority structures and strengthening the chiefs position (Lindemann, 2011, p.1848). This had a 
great effect on the state building after independence, since the political composition in Zambia in 
large was a consequence of inclusive bargaining that had to balance tribal considerations (Ibid. p. 
1845). Based on NIE and Khan as well as the theoretical discussion on informality, we can 
conclude that already from when the country was colonized the population was accustomed to 
power structures based on informal patterns (chiefs) and elites. This is especially highlighted by 
McLeod in the section on informality in the theoretical chapter. 
In our case, Kaunda is a “product” of this structure based on informal patterns though he managed 
to avoid conflicts, by taking in to considerations the potential catalysts such as elites and tribes. 
Khan suggests that peace can be obtained when the power structures reflect the distribution of 
economic benefits. Kaunda seems to have managed this exactly by including different tribes and 
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elites in the political framework and by distributing economic benefits to the local chiefs. This 
however would be an expensive price. The effect was often that the money would not distributed 
further to the local communities and projects as intended. This is an example of how the informal 
structures in Zambia was a hindrance when trying to achieve economic growth. 
The political composition in Zambia has in large been a consequence of inclusive elite bargaining 
that balanced tribal considerations. Inclusive elite bargaining is the practice where rulers create 
access or appoints representatives of contesting social groups into positions of power in order to 
balance out disproportions (Ibid. p. 1845).  Zambia contains 73 tribes but are often referred to under 
terms of linguistic divisions (Ibid. p. 1848) (Geloo, 2012). Other than struggling with the old tribal 
traditions, Kaunda also struggled to make appointments with the cabinet. Many were to be pleased 
but ill feelings between the different ministers were hidden beneath the surface. In order to make 
appointments with the cabinet Kaunda struggled to balance between various factions within the 
party e.g. “the old guard of freedom fighters, of whom the majority were Bemba-speakers, from the 
Nothern, Luapla and Copperbelt provinces, and the new, university-educated men who had been 
brought in to government as Parliamentary Secretaries in January 1963; the militants and the 
moderates; and the main linguistic and tribal groups.” (Tordoff, 1974, pp.14-15). The elite 
balancing became a political strategy in order to keep the party as one unit, but it nevertheless had 
its price. From the late 1960s, the distribution of power reflected the population share of the major 
language groups (Lindemann, 2011, p.1849). To accommodate patronage, positions in the public 
sector were created which underwent frequent shuffles, disruptive to policymaking and economic 
objectives (Ibid. p. 1862). This proves Khan‟s point about power structures in developing countries, 
because Kaunda could not establish a political composition without taking into consideration the 
informal structures that already existed. Based on this UNIP managed to prevent civil war, retained 
state power from 1964 to 1991, and to some extend maintained support even through the 
introduction of one-party rule and economic recession. The UNIP government had the overarching 
motto „One Zambia, One Nation‟ practicing tribal balancing by distributing positions of state power 
equitably among competing group representatives (Ibid. p. 1849). There was a high level of 
political, economic and military power sharing, because this practice was extended throughout the 
public sector. Had the one-party rule systematically discriminated against representatives of specific 
groups, violent conflict would likely have followed (Ibid. p. 1859). 
 
Zambia‟s economy in the early years 
Inherited informal structures 
In the first years of independence, Kaunda and UNIP achieved a remarkable economic expansion. 
Up until 1970, the soaring copper prices resulted in the economy averaging a 13% annual growth 
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rate in real terms. After independence, the nationalized mines had a large economic role and social 
functions in Zambia. In 1970, the mining sector stood for 36% of GDP and 58% of government 
revenue (Lundstøl et al., 2013, p.13). Under the colonial period, the privately owned mines had 
taken on some social responsibilities such as sanitation, housing compounds, food rations, sporting 
clubs and medical facilities for mining employees. Acting as a reflection of the government‟s 
developmental philosophy and as a response to union demands, the nationalized mines extended 
this social responsibility to also include services for the entire community. For the community as a 
whole, the mines managed the environment of townships, maintained the roads, collected waste, 
and provided cafeterias, bars and social clubs, such as Youth Development Schemes and woman‟s 
crafts clubs. They also encouraged miner-income-dependent economic activities in the mine areas, 
such as shops and food suppliers. At the time of privatization Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines 
(ZCCM) also had 1-2 hospitals in each mining area and later on started programs for malaria 
control and HIV/AIDS prevention (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.8) (Fraser & Larmer, 2010, p.9+50).   
The fastest growing sector was the manufacturing sector doubling its output in the same period. In 
this period employment also grew at a very fast pace, although very little in the following three 
years. Wages grew remarkably with 97% between 1964 and 1969 while the consumer price index 
only rose 37% (Tordoff, 1974, pp.363-64).  
External factors 
Zambia‟s economic expansion was also a result of the country‟s response to their inherited 
dependence on most of the surrounding white ruled territories such as Rhodesia
6
 and South Africa. 
An oil pipeline to Dar es Salaam (finished in 1968) was established and the co-operation with 
Tanzania on the Tanzara – Tanzania-Zambian railroad was initiated. This benefited Zambia when 
Rhodesia closed its borders to Zambia in 1973 to punish the country for its alleged support to 
“terrorists” operating against Rhodesia. Later on Zambia announced its complete diversion of all 
external trade to alternative routes. The events gave a boost to the copper prices, as seen in figure 6, 
assuming that the export would decline and imports reduced, which was positive for the Zambian 
government since they at this stage struggled with a deteriorating payment-balance problem (Ibid. 
pp. 363-363).  
 
Localization 
Another remarkable socio-economic development in the early years was the localization of work 
force. Employers represented by non-Africans fell from 12 to 7% from 1964-1970, although the 
decline was much slower in the years after. In the mining sector the number of Zambians who took 
                                                 
6
 The Rhodesian UDI in 1965-1979 had great impact on Zambia who relied on import from the former British 
controlled area. 
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over positions previously occupied by expatriates rose in 1964 from 704 to 4.661 in 1970 (Ibid. p. 
364).  
 
Nationalization 
Most significant in regards to economic development was Kaunda‟s reconstruction of the Zambian 
economy. Starting in 1968, several reforms were passed to obtain local control over their economy. 
The nationalization of core industry and firms in 1968-69 also had a political economy dimension, 
extending patronage opportunities into the productive sector, with top positions distributed almost 
equally between members of all language groups (Lindemann, 2011, p.1852). This is an example of 
how far Kaunda took elite bargaining that created strong links between political and economic elites 
and strengthened client-patron relations. We believe that this exchange of goods and services for 
political support was crucial for Kaunda to sustain peace.  
 
In 1968, the government achieved 51% shares in 26 firms and gradually the nationalization took 
off. In 1969, the mines were nationalized and in 1970, the nationalization reached insurance 
companies as well as building-societies (Tordoff, 1974, p.365). The mines were later combined into 
a single national firm ZCCM (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.7) (Larmer, 2010, p.33). The prosperous 
future for the young state was illustrated in one of the highest GDP‟s in Africa - Zambia rose to be 
classified as a middle-income country in 1969. (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, pp.7-8) (Styve, 2013, p.14). 
The nationalization gave the government full control over all major economic sectors except from 
banks and large-scale agriculture. Secondly, other reforms were passed to gain influence in the 
remaining private sector. In the attempt to create jobs for Zambian citizens, restrictions were passed 
to make it difficult for foreigners to trade and start businesses. These policies finally resulted in an 
extension of the reforms that made it impossible, from 1972, for foreigners to get a retail or 
wholesale license. The reforms increased the states control and created opportunities for Zambian 
entrepreneurs, although most of entrepreneurs were previously non-Africans since many Zambians 
lacked education (Tordoff, 1974, pp.365-66). The increase in jobs and better wages together with 
more money directed from the prosperous mine sector to the growing social service sector created 
this new middleclass.   
 
Zambian Humanism 
The growing economy walked hand in hand with Kaunda‟s socio-political ideology known as 
Zambian Humanism though first publically initiated in 1967. Kaunda explains Zambian Humanism 
as having “high valuation of man and respect for human dignity which is a legacy of our tradition” 
and in line with the “best tribal society” as well as a determination that “we in Zambia intend to do 
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everything in our power to keep our society man-centered”. Kaunda‟s ideology basically, 
encouraged “the power of conscience to summon people to self-discipline, self-sacrifice and 
national service” which he stressed was the complete opposite of capitalism (Ibid. p. 389). Even in 
Kaunda‟s political manifesto, it is clear that, he was conscious about the difficulties in unifying a 
society that was initially based on tribal divisions. We credit some of Kaunda‟s success in early 
years to this obvious consciousness concerning the fragile foundation on which he would build the 
new state of Zambia. 
 
The party had a broad and clear set of goals in line with Kaunda‟s Zambian Humanism, focusing on 
the elimination of racial conflicts and segregation left from the colonization as well as a focus on 
individual liberty (Ibid. pp. 388-389). Kaunda‟s National Developmental Plans sought to direct the 
profits of the copper mines toward building hospitals, schools, and universities and subsidizing 
state-owned manufacturing companies (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.7). Zambian Humanism is also 
especially centered around “raising the standard of living, achieving a more equitable distribution of 
wealth, humanizing conditions of labor and maximizing social security (in particularly, free health 
services and expanded educational facilities). Moreover, Kaunda focused on trade, industry and 
agriculture in “the interest of the people” (Ibid. p. 14).  
 
The implementation of the ideology focused on nationalization, creating jobs and a big social 
service sector. Though, Kaunda did not use the same terminology as Heintz‟s and the WB‟s 
“inclusive growth” or North‟s “open access”, we argue that his approach to achieving social and 
economic growth actually contained elements of these approaches. He also focused on eliminating 
the growing gap in life style between rural and urban Zambians. The gap was according to Kaunda 
both immoral, dangerous to the goal of being one nation and could possibly cause rural exploitation. 
As a result, Zambian Humanism should be in favor of rural areas. Therefore, rural areas should be 
transformed by raising the range and volume of agricultural output encouraging new social modes 
such as co-operatives, self-help projects and village regrouping (Ibid. p. 386). The implementation 
strategy of the self-help rural projects turned out to be more problematic than expected. Committees 
with elderly uneducated headmen in charge often led the self-help projects and this in cohesion with 
decreasing copper revenues delayed and stopped many projects. Furthermore, tensions occurred as a 
result of the Local Government Act and challenged the process of the self-help projects since this 
basically established a uniform pattern of democratic local authorities throughout Zambia which 
was yet another “blow to the power and prestige of traditional authorities”, finding it hard to 
cooperate with the central government (Ibid. p. 21).  
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The first years went fairly well perhaps living on the euphoria of independence and finally getting 
majority rule as well as soaring copper prices, localization, nationalization and general 
improvements in infrastructure, a growing social service sector, more jobs and better wages. 
However, the attempt of a radical societal change from the inherited British institutions to Zambian 
Humanism as well as rapid economic growth and social development was not without conflicts.  
 
Political battle  
The first moves to an opposition of UNIP started in 1968 when the opposition “scored electoral 
gains at UNIP‟s expense”. In 1971, United Progressive Party (UPP) emerged and had primarily 
support in the Bemba-speaking areas in the Northern and Copperbelt areas. Although UNIP 
remained dominant throughout the period of the First Republic (1964-73), Kaunda's style contained 
compromise “among divergent political tendencies”. His balancing act among the competing 
political interests of Zambia's ethnically difficult society depended on “the distribution of 
appointments to party and state offices among leaders from the country's main regions.” Kaunda 
declared his preference for single-party rule, but guaranteed the Zambian people that UNIP may 
well win its desired monopoly through the election. As it happened, however, he ultimately resorted 
to oppression. Faced with the risk that UNIP might lose its parliamentary majority to a combined 
ANC-UPP challenge in the 1973 general elections, he excluded the UPP and detained its leaders. 
After convincing the ANC to join the UNIP in return for a share of cabinet positions, Kaunda 
declared a single-party state on 13 December 1973 (Bratton, 1992, p.5). Once again Kaunda‟s 
actions reflect the patron-client relations. According to the NIE this is a typical characteristic of 
limited access societies as elites change the rules to their advantages and create new rules. This is 
exactly what happened when Kaunda felt threatened – he excluded the biggest threat (UPP), joined 
with ANC and created a one-party participatory democracy and the Second Republic of Zambia was 
born. 
 
The new constitution protected the principle of party supremacy, giving “directives issued by 
UNIP's Central Committee precedence over any parliamentary or governmental decision. As leader 
of the sole legal party, the president appointed all senior party and government officials, including 
cabinet ministers, drawing many directly from the UNIP Central Committee” (Ibid. p. 83).  
 
Challenges  
In the spirit of Zambian Humanism, the copper mines and many other companies were as 
mentioned nationalized and the government also gained significant control in the remaining private 
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companies. Furthermore, the government had rapidly expanded the social service sector and public 
education. 
The nationalized mines and growing social service sector had created a significant rural to urban 
migration. The new urban dwellers had more demands and expectations as to housing, social 
services and jobs but often experienced overcrowded and insanitary slums as was the case in 
Lusaka, Kitwe and other Copperbelt towns (Tordoff, 1974, p.16). The rapid growth immediately 
after independence caused ever-growing demands from the new middle class of Zambia but the 
government‟s capacity to comply was simply reduced and in many cases unable to meet the 
demands. This according to Khan happens when changes in benefits do not reflect the perceived 
distribution of power. In this case, the urban migrants expected social services that turned out not to 
be provided for, in their eyes this reflected an imbalance in benefits.   
The development can also be interpreted as a symbol of a clash between the society that the new 
middle class was aiming for, consuming more, demanding ever better social services and higher 
wages as well as a concern for a rise in corruption among administrative and political leaders and 
Kaunda‟s socialistic transformation of the Zambian society (Ibid. p. 395).  
This was not only a result of decreasing copper prices but also a result of a, in the end, 
administratively poor social sector. In the first face of independence the Zambian population was 
not yet educated or skilled but there was a lot of demanding uneducated party activists who wanted 
government employment as a reward, which created conflicts since the government really needed 
“an efficient administratively, machine to implement all its policies” (Ibid. p. 15). Again, the 
government had to compromise and employed many of the activists in the public sector resulting in 
a steadily growing institution with ambiguously defined posts where the politicians, knowing little 
of what they were doing, controlled public offices (Ibid. p. 16). Moreover, the nationalization and 
worsened conditions for foreign investors had chased skilled but non-African businessmen out of 
the country with no one to take over (Ibid. p. 366). 
Inherited over-dependence  
The rapid development and improvements in the early years was challenged by the decreasing 
copper prices and over dependency on copper mines which was another colonial legacy. Over the 
ten years, of the Central African Federation existence, focus on agriculture was neglected and 
Southern Rhodesia was developed into a manufacturing zone of the Federation. At independence, 
Zambia had become dependent on manufactured imports from Southern Rhodesia while “essential 
foodstuffs were already being imported in large quantities (Ibid. p. 17).   
The overdependence on copper led the government to follow a strategy focusing on investment on 
infrastructural development such as education and transport. Employment was to be increased 
rapidly, the economy was to be diversified away from copper to a developed agricultural sector, by 
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establishing, a manufacturing sector funded as a start by import substitution. The strategy is being 
questioned by Tordoff, who refers to “at least one economist” that criticized the approach. The 
strategy is criticized not for its focus on agriculture since, as is pointed out by the author, 70% of 
the Zambian population lived off the land. Instead, it is criticized for its attempt to expand education 
at a very high rate, because the high rate in job opportunities was, seemingly unlikely to follow the 
high education rate. Tordoff also refers to a critique of the idea of focusing on creating a 
manufacturing sector and perhaps ignoring the fact that Zambia might not be able to produce and 
sell to at least the same price as the imported manufacturing products. Although criticized, it is also 
commented, that politically it would have been difficult for the new government to “deny the 
universal demand for education and not to attempt to create new employment opportunities through 
the creation of a strong manufacturing sector” (Ibid. pp. 16-18). All these factors in a combination 
with the decrease of the copper mines turned out to be a huge challenge to the institutionalization of 
Zambian Humanism.  
Intervention 
Since the economy was very sensitive to copper price fluctuations, the economic success turned into 
crisis, when copper prices began to plummet after the first oil crisis of 1974 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, 
p.8). Along with the IMF, the Zambian government assumed the decrease in prices to be temporary, 
and started borrowing from IMF to maintain social provisions and to meet the shortfalls in the 
foreign exchange balance (Ibid) (Jerven, 2014, p.169). As the copper prices continued to fall, 
coupled with rising prices for oil and other industrial imports,  the Zambian external debt increased 
substantially from US$800 million in 1970 to US$3,2 billion in 1980 (Situmbeko & Zulu, 2004, 
p.21). After the second oil crisis of 1979, the debt was exacerbated when interest rates amplified. 
Zambia was in economic peril, per capita income dropped 50% between 1974 and 1994 and Zambia 
became the 25
th
 poorest country in the world. (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.8). This shows exactly how 
extreme the conditions in Zambia became. Kaunda‟s approach to social and economic development, 
similar to inclusive growth, quickly created a huge middle class in Zambia but in spite of this 
Zambia became the 25
th  
poorest country in the world.
 
This prompted pressure from the IMF and the WB for the country to implement liberalized 
economic policies. In 1983, the first SAP was introduced, obliging the government to implement 
policy measures such as decontrol of prices, interest rate and import licensing liberalization, as well 
as government expenditures restrictions, including wage freezing and reduction of subsidies to food 
and fertilizer (Ibid. p. 9) (Situmbeko & Zulu, 2004, pp.21-22). This SAP seemingly did nothing to 
relief the situation. Between 1983 and 1986, inflation grew, so did the budget and trade deficits in 
addition to GDP growth being 0%. The reforms were politically unpopular, resulting in student riots 
in 1984, industrial unrest in 1985 and the Copperbelt food riots in 1986. Again, we observe that 
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Khan‟s predictions on the rise of conflicts. As living standards, worsen and are not in line with what 
the population expects even more the level of conflict increase. Consequently, the government 
broke away from the conditions of SAP in 1987and introduces their own New Economic Recovery 
Programme, which rolled back reforms on import and price controls, foreign exchange and interest 
rates, and limited debt payments to 10% of net export earnings. Subsequently GDP rose 3,1% in 
1987 and 5,6% in 1988 (Ibid. p. 22). This shift however was not popular with donors, who almost 
collectively withdrew from Zambia, forcing the country to return to a new SAP in 1989. Donors 
came back after the country devalued their currency, decontrolled prices and made cuts to food 
subsidies (Ibid, p. 23) (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.9). The unpopularity of the SAP persisted with 
riots and unrest, and union support for Kaunda‟s UNIP party plunged.  
UNIP‟S downfall 
UNIP‟s downfall can also be seen in relation to their inclusive elite bargaining strategy that did not 
properly address class division. Their former stronghold, the urban Copperbelt, had not been 
incorporated and lacked recognizable representation in the national structure. Therefore, unions 
began to fill that political void, which lead to the creation of the broad-based opposition that 
eventually removed UNIP from power (Lindemann, 2011, pp.1852-53). This is diverging from the 
points made by Khan since this is a contestation of political power based on movements from 
“below” and not from elites in the beginning. This movement against the contemporary power 
structures goes through a process of formalization as this dissatisfaction from below manifests itself 
in the Unions and first at this point becomes an aspect of struggle between elites. The power of the 
unions as a factor of both political and social importance rests upon the fulfilment of demands from 
their members. 
UNIP had since the enforcement of the one-party participatory democracy: 
Manipulated the electoral rules in order to consolidate its control over the 
recruitment and rise of political leaders. The UNIP Central Committee began 
disqualifying parliamentary candidates after the primaries (in an average of one-fifth 
of all constituencies), especially if they were suspected sympathizers of former 
opposition parties or members of an emerging independent bloc in the National 
Assembly (Bratton, 1992, p.84). 
Furthermore, in 1980 UNIP pushed through a legislation “limiting voting in local government 
elections to party members only, thus further undermining the political rights of Zambian citizens” 
(Bratton, 1992, p.84). This led to the creation of the opposing party MMD, formed by unions and 
led by union leader Frederick Chiluba, who won elections in 1991 by a landslide and reelected in 
1996. Chiluba was president until 2002; where after Levy Mwanawasa also from MMD was elected 
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president. Mwanawasa died from a stroke in 2008 and then Rupiah Banda took presidency and had 
power until after the election in 2011.  
  
The Third Republic of Zambia - New government and political strategy away from Zambian 
Humanism 
Even though Chiluba‟s MMD government officially rejected tribal balancing as undemocratic and 
harmful economically (and was accused of favoring Chiluba‟s tribe) informally tribal balancing was 
still retained although not as equitably. Overall, the MMD continued in UNIP‟s footsteps by 
building support through high degrees of political, economic and military power sharing 
(Lindemann, 2011, pp.1854-55). And though, MMD had originally gained support because of their 
resistance against SAP, they won elections on the promise of liberalization - wanting to follow 
donor demands in order to win back the trust of international banks and investors. This policy 
clearly won back some legitimacy as donors responded by providing aid money over the first few 
years, making the fiscal budget 40% donor dependent (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.9). The aid loan 
conditions were often related to demands of privatization. 
From 1991-2011 MMD guided the country towards a more liberal and free-market economy.  In 
1992, an elaborate and swift privatization program began, in which the government by 2001 had 
sold off 257 of their 280 state-owned corporations in various sectors (Situmbeko & Zulu, 2004, 
p.25). The privatization under the MMD opened up for rent-seeking and corruption. Privatization 
spoils seem to have been shared relatively equally between language groups, except a 
disproportionately large share going to Zambians of Asian descent – Confirming the public 
perception that privatization benefitted foreign investors and „non-Zambian‟ citizens (Lindemann, 
2011, p.1857). The privatization reduced patron-client relations but did not have the economic 
efficiency effects envisioned. Instead, the privatization and deregulation fostered elite accumulation 
and corruption, where companies were often stripped of assets or relocated causing a vast loss of 
wealth (Ibid. p. 1865).  Small scale companies were for example bought up cheaply by 
administration and political office holders. Chiluba and his close relations where the main 
beneficiaries and were charged in a later anti-corruption initiative. 
Debts and DAs  
The privatization of the copper mines had been a huge sticking point throughout the process and 
was continuously delayed, creating tensions between government and donors. Zambia‟s debt 
burden, which had increased to a total of US$7 billion by 1990, was used by the donors to push 
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through the privatization, by making ZCCM sales a pre-condition for qualifying for the HIPC
7
 debt 
relief initiative (Situmbeko & Zulu, 2004, p.23) (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.10). 
We were told by advisers, who included the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, that not in my lifetime would the price of copper change. They put 
production models on the table and told us that there [was] no copper in Nchanga 
mine, Mufulira was supposed to have five years’ life left and all the production models 
that could be employed were showing that, for the next 20 years, Zambian copper 
would not make a profit. [Conversely, if we privatized] we would be able to access 
debt relief, (…) We had no option - Edith Nawakwi, former finance minister of 
Zambia (ACTSA; Christian Aid; SCIAF, 2007, p.6). 
By this time, the mines had become an expense for the state, at one point losing up to US$1 million 
a day (Ibid). As elaborated in the section Zambian economy and economic factors, investments in 
ZCCM had been low during the crisis and as a consequence equipment wore down, production 
costs rose and production fell from a peak of 750,000 tons in 1973 to 257,000 tons in 2000 (Fraser 
& Lungu, 2007, p.8).  
In order to attract investors for mining a new The Mines and Minerals Act was introduced in 1995. 
This act, which was not only influenced by IMF and WB but also by potential investors, included a 
mineral royalty tax of 3%, allowed for several tax deductions and exceptions, and permits the 
government to grant more incentives to specific companies through Development Agreements 
(DAs) (Ibid. p. 11). To prepare for privatization the government drastically cut the workforce from 
56,582 in 1991 to 31,000 in 1997 – and almost immediately after sales of the mines in 2001 
employment numbers had decreased to 19,145 (Ibid. p. 21). ZCCM was divided into seven units 
and sold to private investors between 1997 and 2000 – with the state retaining a minority share of 
three units (Ibid. pp. 12-14).  
 
Secret negotiations and limited state capacity  
The negotiated DAs were kept secret but some have since leaked. The highlighted trends of the 
agreements are as follows: Reduced mining corporation income tax to 25% (compared to 35% in 
manufacturing), with allowed deductions from expenditures such as mineral royalty payments, 
current year capital expenditures and accumulated losses carried forward from previous years (loss 
carried forward periods ranging between 10-20 years). Reduction of mineral royalty tax to 0,6% of 
gross value of sales (from 3%). Exception from customs, excise duties or import tax on machinery 
and equipment. A 15-20 year fiscal stability clause, preventing the government from making any 
alterations in the taxation regime. Some contracts included a price participation agreement were 
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governments could claim a percentage of sales, if the copper prices at London Metal Exchange 
exceeded US$2700 – Price partition costs is however tax deductible, meaning that the effect on 
government revenue is minimal. Exceptions from environmental laws, relieving the companies of 
any clean-up responsibility of pollution that could be perceived as historic and exempted from 
environmental responsibility if pollution does not excessively exceed the pollution levels of ZCCM 
(Manley, 2013, pp.30-31) (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, pp.20-21). 
The new companies took over ZCCM assets but avoided many liabilities such as: paying pensions 
for ZCCM employees, provision of water, electricity and subsidized housing in townships, and 
maintaining old byproduct storage slime dams and dumps. The companies argued that their core 
business was mining, and consequently responsibilities for social and environmental provisions 
should be maintained by government, local authorities or the market (Ibid. pp. 3-4, 16, 39, 43).  
Given the secrecy of the deals, it was generally assumed that the companies had not been given any 
responsibility to continue ZCCM programs in the local area. However the introductions of the 
agreements seems to declare differently e.g. “GRZ8 wishes to ensure that the continued 
development and exploitation (…) at the Facilities‟ mines (…) will secure the maximum benefit for, 
and adequately contribute to the advancement and the social and economic welfare of, the people of 
Zambia, including the people in the vicinity of the Contract Area in a manner consistent with their 
needs and the protection of the environment…” (Ibid. p. 16). In the agreements the responsibilities 
of mine associated schools, hospitals, sponsored leisure activities and roads tended to be transferred 
to the new companies or it was asserted how costs of maintaining the structure should be divided 
between company, local authority and users. The DAs often required free service to retirees and 
workers dependents, but allowing the general public to be charged for services that were previously 
free. Likewise in many agreements the new companies are responsible for maintaining contracting 
systems that favor local businesses and suppliers. For example buying from local suppliers to create 
linkages rather than importing.  
However, a decade after the DAs were created, trade unions, MPs, local governments and even 
regulating authorities had never been allowed to see them and could subsequently not hold the 
companies accountable (Ibid. p. 17). This can be seen as evidence of a limited state capacity.  
Economy after privatization 
The new mining companies brought in the massive investments that were seriously lacking; 
between 2000 and 2013 up to US$8 billion had been invested in the mining sector. Production 
output has subsequently rebounded from 257,000 tons in 2000 to over 800,000 ton in 2012. 
Employment has risen from 19,145 in 2001 to 74,000 jobs in 2012 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, pp.8, 19, 
21) (Zambia Development Agency, 2013, p.3). Mining companies have however been criticized for 
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casualization of workers. After privatization, new workers were primarily hired by subcontractors 
or hired as casual workers, with lower pay, no security and no pension (Lee, 2010, p.131). In 2004, 
45% of workers were not under any form of permanent contract (Fraser & Larmer, 2010, p.14).   
These tendencies prove that economic growth does not always translate to social development. But 
then again economic growth is not necessarily meant to create social development. In this case, 
however, it turns out, that the private companies had in fact, as part of their contract, the 
responsibility to maintain certain social services. This part has been neglected. Had the private firms 
kept their part of the bargain, then perhaps there would have been a balance in both economic and 
social growth.   
In 2005 Zambia completed HIPC and received a debt reduction, the following year the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative announced that those countries that had completed HIPC would receive a 
substantial additional debt write-off. This reduced Zambia‟s debt to 1/10th of its previous level, 
from US$7.1 billion to US$500 million (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.60).  
Economic achievements vs. social development   
Even though the economy improved while MMD was in charges it never really translated into 
social development of the majority of the population (Diakonia Zambia, 2013, p.21). An example of 
this tendency prevails in people forced into subsistence farming increased from 49,8% in 1990 to 
72,2% in 2005 and a decrease from 10,9% in 1990 to 7,1% in 2005 in people employed in the 
industrial sector as seen in figure 3 and 4.  
The positive economic development can be attributed President Mwanawasa and not Chiluba, as the 
development shows that from 1991-2001 there was economic stagnation (see figure 1) as well as 
high job losses (Ibid. p. 21).  
Changes in mining taxation   
In 2003, the copper prices began to rebound to unprecedented levels and have remained high except 
for a short-term dip in 2008-09. When the high copper prices did not translate into improved 
conditions for the Zambian public, it fueled civil resentment and strikes (Manley, 2012, pp.25-26). 
This prompted enough public pressure to make the Zambian government the break the DAs stability 
clause and impose a new tax regime in 2008. The reform included an increase in company tax from 
25% to 30%. Mineral royalty raised from 0,6% to 3%
9
. A change in deductions on: capital 
expenditure from 100% to 25% and loss carried forward allowances fixed to a maximum of 10 
years (from 10-20 years). Most controversial was the introduction of a Windfall tax. The Windfall 
tax was a variable rate royalty that was put into effect when copper prices reached certain thresholds 
(shown in the graph below) (Manley, 2013, p.34).   
Figure 13 - Windfall tax 
                                                 
9 Now only based on London Metal Exchange prices to prevent tax evasion and avoidance. 
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Many companies refused to pay and the Windfall tax received a lot of criticism for being flawed, 
because it could lead to a tax burden of over 100%. Furthermore, breaking the DAs was illegal and 
the mining companies had the right to seek financial damages from the government. This prompted 
a lengthy bargaining process that we will elaborate on in the second part of our analysis. Due to a 
short-term drop in copper prices causing worker dismissals and as a bargaining response, the 
windfall tax (as well as capital expenditure deduction allowances) was reversed in 2009 (Ibid. pp. 
34-36). When PF later came into power the taxation regime was changed again, raising mineral tax 
from 3% to 6% and for tax income purposes „hedging‟ and „operation income‟ was to be treated 
separately (Ibid. p. 36).   
Finding its way to democracy 
Whereas Chiluba is accused of corruption and being more concerned about wealth creation and 
distribution rather than concerns about peoples welfare and livelihood (Diakonia Zambia, 2013, 
p.22). Mwanawasa is remembered for his battle against corruption. This has improved the general 
view of the government and the report “Political governance study” claims that Zambia is well on 
its way to democracy, good governance and leadership institutions, which can probably be 
explained with the implementations of a multiparty democratic system (Ibid. p. 26).  
According to the Zambia -European Community Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme for the period 2008- 2013 the; 
Government effectiveness is the governance area in which Zambia is worst 
performing, below the Sub-Saharan average. The Government still struggles with 
accountability for public resources and inability to effectively deliver services. A 
Public Sector Reform Programme has been running for some years; restructuring of 
the civil service took place with reduction of the wage bill to a more manageable 8% 
of GDP. Salaries in the civil service remain uncompetitive and generate serious 
human resource problems (Zambia and European Community, 2013, p.33). 
During Mwanawasa‟s presidency, Zambia still struggled with a declining state capacity not able to 
meet peoples demands for employment because of “staff shortage, unmotivated and often 
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ineffective or absent staff” as well as continuing concern about corruption (Diakonia Zambia, 2013, 
p.20), which contributed to MMD losing the election in 2011 to PF. 
  
PF takes over 
When the Patriotic front (PF), with Bamba speaking Michael Sata
10
 as president, came into power 
in 2011, it was on a promise of fighting corruption, creating pro-poor growth and helping the 
nation‟s poor (Patriotic Front, 2011, p.4) (Mulenga, 2012). So far,  
The PF government has demonstrated that it is possible for the treasury to timely 
release development resources to spending ministries, which has enhanced the 
performance of most ministerial departments in providing services. However, despite 
the treasury being efficient at this, many departments faced high levels of absorption 
capacity challenges (Diakonia Zambia, 2013, p.25). 
 
It seems to us, that this is evidence of a state lacking the capacities and obligation (either as a result 
of the political culture or as a result of poor skills) to run the state in so far as delivering what is 
expected.  
Anti-corruption campaign led by Sata‟s family forest  
Sata led a harsh anti-corruption campaign reestablishment the 'abuse of office clauses
11
 in the 
country's anti-corruption laws. PF had the Anti-corruption Commission run the implementation, 
which proved very efficient and helped regain the trust and pave the way for a new perception of 
corruption as being common in relation to public affairs (Ibid.). Furthermore, Sata, in line with PF‟s 
political manifesto promised to base public service appointments purely on merit and did not 
mention tribal balancing (Patriotic Front, 2011, p.44). While gaining trust in relation to battling 
corruption PF suffers from accusations of nepotism and tribalism. Sata has appointed a majority of 
Bemba speakers (his own tribe) and family members in powerful positions. Whereas Mwanawasa 
was accused of building a family tree Sata is being accused of building a family forest. This is a 
good example of what NIE classifies as personal exchanges which is characteristic of limited access 
societies. Even more problematic is the perceived tribalism that has created persistent tribal tensions 
and overall worries that this could hurt national cohesion and peace (Geloo, 2012) (Mulenga, 2012) 
(Gilbert & Mureriwa, 2014).  
PF has emphasized, in their development agenda, the level of commitment that the they have to 
address severe incidences of poverty that the majority of citizens are experiencing. So far, there has 
been notable involvements to start development projects across the country. For example, PF 
                                                 
10
 Sata was a defector from MMD.  
11
 Refer to the Anti-Corruption Amendment Act of 2012 
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increased budgetary allocations to the health, education, agricultural sectors. PF has also placed 
special emphasis on infrastructural development across the country in an attempt to create 
opportunities for rural development and create jobs and wealth for the citizens. These initiatives are 
all in line with the pro-poor aspects of the inclusive growth approach.  
Sub-conclusion   
This part of our analysis shows how Zambia went from a stage of prosperous development after 
independence to a state of increased fragility, where more and more emphasis was placed on tribal 
balance and the maintenance of peace. Kaunda achieved peace by incorporating elite bargaining and 
tribal balancing.  
Nationalization, economic growth and social development in the early years of independence 
created more jobs, better wages, social security and a growing social sector as well as infrastructural 
development projects leading to the creation of a well established Zambian middle class. The use of 
elite bargaining and tribal balancing was seemingly not beneficial for the state capacity and for 
economic growth. The state capacity was also challenged by the lack of educated Zambians and 
skilled workers.  
Dependency on copper, inherited by the colonizers, challenged by external factors such as 
Rhodesian UDI and declining copper prices resulted in trade difficulties and a mismatch between 
the new middle class‟ expectations and what the government could provide. Lack of foreign 
investment in the non-Zambian hostile and nationalized market contributed to the difficulties in 
creating a sustainable business environment. The increasingly unpopular Kaunda felt threatened and 
created The Second Republic of Zambia that challenged the democratic legitimacy. Steady 
economic and social decline resulted in a number of SAP‟s in return for IMF, WB and donor 
support. This as well as contempt for Kaunda‟s political willfulness gave way to the Third Republic 
of Zambia and MMD‟s electoral victory. 
With MMD at the helm, liberalization and privatization resulted in legitimacy with donors, but also 
opened up for corruption and elite accumulation. Furthermore, the economic growth still did not 
translate into improvement in the livelihoods of the majority of the citizens and that became the end 
of MMD in government.  
PF won the election on the background of promising poverty reduction and a battle against 
corruption. The PF government has demonstrated that its government is committed to release funds 
towards development that are given to different ministries, which has enhanced the performance of 
most ministerial departments in providing services. However, despite the Treasury being efficient at 
this, many departments faced high levels of absorption capacity challenges. Corruption seem to 
have been replaced by nepotism and tribalism challenging national peace. 
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The development in Zambia since independence leaves signs of little respect for pluralism and 
democracy. Both Kaunda‟s transition to the Second Republic of Zambia, Chiluba‟s corrupted ways 
and Sata‟s use of nepotism demonstrates this. The one-party rule seem to have indoctrinated a 
patrimonial political culture where people end up believing that their well-being depends on 
attaching themselves to the coattails of powerful political leaders. A political culture of dormancy 
and loyalty rather than active criticism, opposition, or dissent.  
Analysis – part 2 
Which consequences has privatization had for inclusive growth? 
Development Agreements and taxation  
As described in analysis one, the DAs had extended very favorable taxation conditions to the 
mining companies, in fact the Zambia mining tax regimes was one of the lowest in the world (Adam 
& Simpasa, 2010, p.69). From analysis one it can be derived that the extent of the beneficial 
treatment of investors should be viewed in relation to the following factors: Timing could not have 
been worse. The agreements were made when copper prices were at an all-time low point, after 
decades of decline and just a few years before the copper price rebounded; At this point, the mines 
were an expense to the government which left the government in a weakened negotiation position; 
The privatization was a donor loan conditionality and IMF and WB advised the government to 
create an „investor friendly‟ regulatory regime and make itself more attractive than its neighbors; 
Weak government negotiator capacity to incorporate clauses where the country would benefit in 
case of rising copper prices. 
The weak position of the government has had many consequences on the possibility of inclusive 
growth. Taxation of the natural resources creates government revenue that can be redistributed into 
public services and infrastructure that can be beneficial for social development and inclusive 
growth.  
From privatization up until 2008, the taxation structure from the DAs was in effect. Data from 2001 
until 2008 reveal that despite rising copper prices the revenue was very limited. Between 2001 and 
2007, no company taxes were paid from the mining industry. Mineral royalties were also very 
limited during this period ranging from 0.02% to 0.17% of GDP, averaging at 0.07% of GDP (Ibid. 
p. 76). In 2008 however revenues had a slight increase with mining company tax contributing to 
revenue with 0.23% of GDP and mineral royalties adding up to  0,39% of GDP. In 2008 this meant 
that the government received US$69 million in revenue (3,41% of total revenue) from the mining 
sector, which is considered to be quite low considering the sectors size (Ibid.) (CTPD, 2012).  
In 2008 a new tax regime was introduced (the process of this reform will be elaborated in the next 
paragraph). The new tax regime, combined with the expiration of some tax incentives from the 
DAs, resulted in a dramatic increase in tax revenue. Revenues increased from US$69 million in 
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2008 to US$789 million in 2010 and US$1550 million in 2011
12
 (ZEITI, 2014, pp.11-12). It is 
evident that Zambia has missed out on massive tax revenues in relation to the copper price boom. 
To make the scope of the loss of revenues clear, we can compare 2008 to 2011 based on our data. 
During that period, copper prices increased by 22%, production levels by 43%
13
 yet the tax revenue 
had a 2146% increase.  
The tax regime was changed in 2008. Public discontent that copper extraction did not translate into 
benefits for Zambians, led to strikes and MMD losing elections in the Copperbelt region in 2006. 
This public pressure led the government to illegally break away from the DAs in 2008, with an 
increase in tax rates and the introduction of the windfall tax (see description in analysis one) 
(Manley, 2012, pp.25-26).  
This was the start of a lengthy elite bargaining process. The companies did not appreciate the 
government breaking away from the DA and refused to cooperate with the new tax regime (Ibid. p. 
27 ff.). Seen from a holding power point of view, the companies had a lot more fiscal stamina to 
endure in such a bargaining conflict and had the legal upper hand. Companies had bargaining power 
in the ability to reduce investments and thereby hurting employment and the economy of Zambia. 
Furthermore, companies knew that if the government violated the DAs without reaching a new 
agreement with the companies, this would damage the government‟s reputation and impairment its 
ability to attract future investments. By invoking the new tax regime without negotiations, the 
government attempted to relieve the public pressure but it also changed the bargaining starting 
point, from the DAs to the new tax structure. Like so many times before the volatility of copper 
prices played a crucial role. The short term, drop in prices lead to a drop in investments and 
employment, this was the bargaining straw that broke the governments back. Public pressure and 
strikes were however also a concern for the companies, and when elections approached they were 
ready to reach an agreement (Ibid). The bargaining only amounted to a small improvement to the 
taxation agreement and the government promising not to invoke windfall taxes. Even though the 
government did succeed in changing the DAs tax structure, the holding power of the companies 
combined with outside forces made sure that those changes were still beneficial to the companies. 
Drawing on Khan, Harvey and North, two scenarios as to why the bargaining process described 
above turned out the way it did prevails. Khan points out that holding power is depended on the 
ability to hold out in conflicts. The greater costs a group, in this case, the companies can impose on 
others, the Zambian government, the greater the likelihood that the other group, the Zambian 
government, will abandon their attempts to get their preferred outcomes. In this scenario, the 
government simply lost the battle because of too many imposed costs by the companies. Harvey 
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 As it can be seen in figure 11 overall government revenue has steadily risen and has not had the considerable jump 
that our data on mining revenue suggests. This could be due to statistical inconsistencies and uncertainties.      
13
 572,793 ton in 2008 (Zambia Development Agency, 2013, p.3) & 819,574 ton in 2011 (ZEITI, 2014, p.11) 
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though, points to the fact that the economy and the state always have been linked for different 
reasons. Economic elites, in this case the companies, have always needed security concerning their 
affairs and the state, the Zambian government acting on behalf of the state, has always needed the 
economic elite for the financing of its activities. In order to secure these rights and interests of the 
economic elites a process of formalization then always takes place in the curse of economic 
development. Adding NIE‟s perspective on limited societies, we know that the institutions, in these 
societies, are not necessarily created to be socially efficient but are created to serve the interest of 
elites and those with bargaining power to create new rules. Could it be that Zambian elites, partially 
made up by the government who runs the institutions, settled with the companies demands to serve 
their own interests, assuming that the companies would then not challenge the government? In 
addition, it has to be said though, that the companies also gave up part of their demands and settled 
with MMD before the upcoming elections fearing the alternative PF, who would be even worse to 
bargain with and therefore the outcome can be ascribed to a combination of the two scenarios 
proposed by the theories.  In spite of the arrangement between MMD and the companies, PF 
doubled the mining royalty rate in 2012 further balancing out the inequalities from the DAs. 
 
The variable structure of the tax regime given in the DAs is also problematic. One major problem 
regarding collection of tax revenue from the mines is the Zambian Revenue Authority‟s lack of 
capacity to collect taxes from multinationals. The variable structure of the corporate tax system is 
demanding to administer and especially difficult in regards to enforcing transfer pricing rules, since 
many companies have branches in tax havens. Therefore, it is a widely held view that many large 
companies in Zambia can effectively choose the amount of corporate tax they wish to pay (CTPD, 
2012). Capacity building assistance from the Norwegian government has begun to alleviate some of 
the shortcomings in capacity and has resulted in increased tax revenue, there is however still a vast 
lack of capacity and funding (Styve, 2013, p.13).  
 
This lack of capacity is additionally problematic given that some mining companies have been 
accused of tax avoidance and tax evasion. An example is Mopani Copper Mine: Mopani Copper 
Mine has carried forward losses for at least the first ten years, resulting in a net loss and therefore 
paid no corporate taxes (Grant Thornton & Econ Pöyry, 2010, p.22) (CTPD, 2012). In 2009 an 
audit was carried out by international auditing firms Grant Thornton and Econ Pöyry, on behalf of 
the Zambian authorities. A pilot of the report was leaked to the public in 2011 (Ibid. 2012). The 
report contained grave accusations against Mopani Copper Mine, including lack of cooperation, 
underrepresentation of profits, over reporting expenditures and transfer miss pricing in sales to its 
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mother company (Grant Thornton & Econ Pöyry, 2010). Accusations were completely denied by 
the owner (Glencore International , 2011) and the case has so far not been resolved.  
 
The privatization did succeed in attracting much needed capital investment that has restored 
production levels. Copper prices did however determine the scope of investment and it is widely 
speculated in the literature that FDI inflows would not have existed had prices been dormant.      
 
State capacity and political consequences of privatization 
As we learn from analysis part 1, different factors and relations have been constructive for Zambia‟s 
state capacity even before privatization. It will therefore be utterly biased to assume that 
privatization in itself has been the cause of the state of affairs in Zambia. Privatization changed the 
dynamics of the revenues especially considering the section on how DAs were made to favor 
investors rather than the Zambian state. However, we observe that, state capacity was “fragile” to 
begin with and consequently, privatization highlighted just how uncoordinated the organizations 
and the institutions were. Besides, the evidence of weak state capacity observed in the DAs, issues 
of adherence to Zambian law by some investors have been reported by the media and civil society. 
The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report “You‟ll be fired if you refuse” highlights a lack of regular 
inspections by the Zambian Mines Safety Department as contributing to poor and dangerous 
working conditions for miners employed by multinational copper mining operations in Zambia 
(Wells, 2011, p.13). Our observation is that investors choose not to adhere to the law because they 
know that the Zambian law enforce and regulatory system is weak.  A recent follow-up report by 
HRW (Human Rights Watch, 2013) shows that the present PF government has already made 
substantial progress in this area with the Mines Safety Department approved budget for 2013 
increasing to 5.66 million Kwacha from 3.11 million Kwacha in 2012 specifically targeted mine 
inspections.   
Social consequences 
In this section on the analysis we proceed to look at the consequences that privatization has had for 
inclusive growth in the Zambian economy.  
From 1975, the Zambian economy experienced high levels of decline in its economy. Though a 
significant factor of this decline is attributed to the decrease in world copper prices, the general 
preconception about state owned companies in most developing and transitional economies is that, 
they are less efficient than those in industrialized countries (Birdsall & John, 2003, p.2). The idea is 
that they often fail to properly manage the resources they possess, because of lack of enforceable 
property rights, policy deficiencies (e.g., distortionary tax systems, labor market rigidities), 
corruption, and the protected monopolies that state companies often represent (Ibid. pp. 1-3). As we 
accounted for in the first part of the analysis, inclusive elite bargaining affected the efficiency and 
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effectiveness of the parastatal companies, because leadership and employment was based on 
patronage and specifically tribal balancing logics rather than expertise and economic rationalities. 
Following this perception and combined factors like the increasing debt, the exit of donors and a 
long period of staggering copper prices, the IMF pressured Zambia to privatize 280 state- owned 
firms from the 1990‟s14 in exchange for loans. Drawing from the theory sections on inclusive 
growth and the new institution economy, we learn that, as North et al expressed, one of the ways to 
make the transition from a limited access society to an open-access, broad-based society is to make 
firms independent of elites
15
. This is to enhance competitiveness and achieve natural/more efficient 
equilibriums. With this in mind, it makes sense that privatization was seen as a more efficient 
alternative to the state. However, the privatization process in Zambia fostered elite accumulation 
and corruption and did not have the efficiency gains envisioned because many companies were 
striped of assets or relocated. It did however reduce the government‟s patronage opportunities and 
assisted in attracting FDI to the country. As Birdsall and Nellis observe, the pre-privatization 
conditions matter. This is why we have in the first section of the analysis of this thesis focused on 
understanding and analyzing these conditions to better highlight their role on the post-privatization 
consequences. “Complicating matters, one-time privatization events, even if extended over several 
years, may help determine the post-privatization policy and institutional environment, and thus the 
long-term path of a society” (Ibid. p. 3).  
Effects on labor and health care  
After privatization, the companies did not continue public health programs such as anti-malaria 
spraying and HIV/AIDS prevention programs and many hospitals/health clinics were shut down. 
The state was expected to step in but couldn‟t due to their restricted fiscal constraints. Permanent 
workers and their dependents maintained the same health care provisions as during ZCCM
16
, other 
community members however suffered from increased prices and reduced access and quality of 
care (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.40). When worker health quickly deteriorated, some mines restarted 
programs such as preventive malaria spraying. According the mining company CEO Tim 
Henderson, the malaria incidences were really high, 300 in 1000 employees. This was drastically 
reduced to 30 in 1000 after 5 years of preventive spraying (Ibid. p. 46).   
As previously mentioned, one of the areas that were directly affected by the privatization of the 
copper mines was employment. Throughout most of the nationalized period it was a priority to keep 
employment rates high and they stayed almost constant at around 60.000. This previous 
                                                 
14
 In 1992 an elaborate and swift privatization program began, in which the government by 2001 had sold off 257 of 
their 280 sate-owned corporations in various sectors (Situmbeko & Zulu, 2004, p. 25). Privatization of the copper mines 
had been a huge sticking point throughout the process and was continuously delayed, creating tensions between 
government and donors. 
15
 In most developing economies, elites are also influential to the government. 
16
 With the exception of a few cases were dependents could not gain access to hospitals on mine grounds. 
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employment rate is important to note, otherwise the figure below could be misleading. Many 
Zambians were directly employed in the copper sector but the copper mines also fostered 
surrounding businesses and activities. The first issue regarding the workforce during the 
privatization process was the cutting down of workers to a third of its previous level, in order to 
prepare for privatization.  
Figure 14 – Employment at Copper mines 
 
(Wilson, 2010, p.29) 
As it can be seen, in the figure, employment stayed low for several years and then increased from 
2002 to 2008. However, when the global economic crisis hit in 2008 and negatively affected copper 
prices, employment immediately suffered. Within a year more than 19,000 jobs were lost when 
major mines shut down many activities and reduced operations to „care and maintenance‟ 
(Schoneveld et al., 2014, p.15). When copper prices rebounded so did employment reaching 74,000 
jobs in 2012 (Zambia Development Agency, 2013, p.3).  
This illustrates the instability of the employment situation of the mines and subsequently the entire 
Copperbelt region. We find it important to question how reactions would be to a long-term 
recession in prices like those we saw from the mid 70‟s. When a short-term dip in prices facilitates 
an almost immediate response of shutting down part of production, firing a third of the workforce 
and limiting FDI –It is likely that future dips in copper prices will negatively affect employment 
again. Although speculative, it is likely that employment will be kept to a bare minimum, as it was 
during the first years of privatization. The varying benefits of employment and the limited 
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timeframe of non-renewable natural resource extraction make the collection of tax revenue all the 
more important.    
Despite rising tendencies in employment, the additional employees hired after privatization were, as 
mentioned in the first analysis, primarily employed by subcontractors or hired as casual workers. By 
casualizing workers, the employers can get around Zambia‟s labor regulation, meaning that worker 
conditions have deteriorated under the privatization. The district labor commissioner is engaged in 
mining activities but lacks the capacity to monitor and enforce labor laws (Haglund, 2010, p.97).  
It is estimated that 90% of the Zambian workforce is employed by the informal sector (Shah, 2011, 
p.3). This number does not indicate any effects of privatization, however the casualization of formal 
employment and reductions in earnings can lead to more activity in the informal sector. If formal 
employees cannot earn enough household income they would naturally also retain informal 
employment to subsidize these earnings.     
Inability to control the companies is partly due to the government being advised by IMF and WB on 
how to create an „investor friendly‟ regulatory regime. The following „Investment Act‟ and the 
„Mining and Minerals Act‟ effectively removed many of the previous controls the state had to 
regulate company behaviors (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.3). This leaves the state with a weakened 
capacity to enforce law and the promises made in the DAs. Furthermore the secrecy surrounding the 
DAs has made it next to impossible for other authorities, unions and NGOs to put pressure on the 
companies to adhere to their responsibilities.      
As Lungu and Frasier point out, privatization was hoped to 1) revive the dormant copper sector, 2) 
upgrade locals through transfer of knowledge and train the workforce to international standards 3) 
create linkages that would help other sectors. The Zambian government did not put in place 
regulations that would encourage firms to have a long term approach rather than short-term.  This is 
evident in the firms‟ casualizing employment programs; firms are taking advantage of the weak 
labor laws and the lack of regulatory capacity.  In the first period of privatization the employment 
rate was kept low to increase profitability. We observe that this is particularly challenging for 
people in the urban areas, because unlike workers in rural areas, the people in the urban areas, have 
no access to family lands and other resources. With this in mind, we argue that the social 
consequences of privatization have been more threatening on the urban population. However, as 
mentioned before, the rural population and other linked industries have also been affected. 
Lack of employment in the mines can also be seen in urban to rural migration flows and 
employment sector patterns, which, can be seen in figure 3 and 4.  
Figure 14 - Rural and Urban population share (% of total population) 
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Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/. 
As mentioned above there has been a shift in employment patterns between 1990 and 2005. 
Percentage of employment in services fell from 26% to 21%. Employment in industry fell from 
13% to 7%. Employment in agriculture however rose from 61% to 72%. This shift was affected by 
the massive reduction of jobs in the parastatal sector in relation to the privatization process. The 
same period had a flow from urban to rural. Since the urban employment opportunities became 
more limited, employment was sought in rural employment which is dominated by agriculture. 
There is a flow back to urban areas from 2000 that reached pre-1990 levels in 2012. 
One of the main hopes of privatization in Zambia was the opportunity of the workforce to acquire 
new skills and managerial competences. However, in the case of Zambia, we observe a situation 
where these positions have been offered to expatriate workers. As the CEO at the Luanshya mines 
says, “for many companies it may seem easier to bring in expatriate workers.” He suggests however 
”There has got to be a conscience that says, those skills we accept - those ones no. And that I don't 
think this is happening very effectively at the moment. There definitely is an inclination to employ 
expats where you actually have the skills in Zambia.” (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.57). Many critics 
have especially pointed to the Chinese investors as being particular about importing labor from all 
levels of the corporate ladder. They have also been criticized for setting up further linking 
enterprises like Banks and restaurants all of which rob the average Zambian of employment 
opportunities and pushes them into the informal sector. (McGreal, 2007).  
Also, another way that privatization and liberalization has affected other industries besides the 
copper sector is that, it has opened these sectors for competition which they were not prepared for, 
leading to further weakness especially because they were previously subsidized with revenues from 
copper which is no longer the case. The combined effects of the behaviors of the new ownership of 
which most are foreign, the rigid market conditions, industrial and labor laws that date back to the 
1960‟s, and a general lack of the state capacity to make the right legislation to protect the Zambian 
workforce have all worked as a challenge to the process of attaining inclusive growth.  
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The DAs put the companies in charge of keeping up the local contracting systems that was put in 
place under ZCCM. This was to ensure linkages to local businesses and suppliers, creating spillover 
effects from the mining industry. The secrecy of the DAs however hid this fact, it was assumed that 
the agreements had not demanded maintenance of local linkages to suppliers and it was therefore 
not enforced. Exacerbating the linkage problems is the exemptions from import tax granted by the 
government to the companies in the DAs, leaving the mines with no incentives to create or maintain 
domestic suppliers.    
With most shares of the mining sector and revenues in the hands of foreign investors, the issue of 
corporate social responsibility surfaced, since the state could no longer afford to provide any of the 
social benefits that the copper sector delivered under nationalization. Civil society and the media 
began to criticize, foreign firms for their lack of provision of social benefits. As elaborated earlier 
the DAs provided one of the lowest taxation rates in the world. Therefore, the Zambian government 
had not received enough revenue to provide for these services. This has contributed to public 
resentment towards foreigners, leading to reports of riots and even killings in the Copperbelt, as the 
public feel that they are not getting enough out of resources (BBC, 2012).  
A large source of contention is the environmental aspect affecting local residents. Toxic 
contamination of water supply and sulfur dioxide air pollution has caused health issues including 
deaths and has limited the possibility for poor locals to grow sustenance crops. Because the DAs 
exempted companies from any historic clean-up responsibility, this meant that it was very difficult 
to enforce environmental regulations of pollution that could be perceived as historic. Moreover, the 
DAs allowed for new companies to pollute as long as pollution did not exceed ZCCM levels, even 
though ZCCM would have been fined for such actions (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, pp.33-35). 
Furthermore, the environmental regulators do not have the equipment or capacity to carry out 
independent controls, which means that it is the companies that supply readings and largely self-
regulate (Counter Balance, 2010, p.11). The DAs therefore weakened the already limited regulatory 
ability and does not properly protect the local residents.  
Another problem from privatization is the introduction of fees on services that used to be free of 
charge. Creating user fees will have a negative impact on access for the poorest citizens. This user 
tax is levied no matter the users‟ income level, decreasing public access to health and education and 
thus working against poverty reduction (Fraser & Lungu, 2007, p.55).   
Effects on poverty 
A 2011 report by the Zambian ministry of Finance and national planning states regarding poverty, 
“Recent growth has not translated into a significant decline in poverty especially in rural areas. 
Inequality increased in both rural and urban areas during the years 1996 to 2006. The 2006 Living 
Conditions and Monitoring Survey (LCMS) revealed that 64% of the population was living below 
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the national poverty line. Although an improvement from 68% in 2004 and 73% in 1998, poverty 
levels in rural areas remained high at 77% in 2006. For the two most urbanized provinces, the 
Copperbelt and Lusaka, where economic activity has increased, the incidence of poverty was below 
the 2006 national poverty line. This seems to suggest that when inequality is high to start with, it 
acts to reduce the impact of growth on poverty reduction.” (Bwalya et al., 2010) 
 
Though not directly stated, the report insinuates that, even though the Zambian economy has seen 
growth in terms of GDP and productivity, this growth has not necessarily translated in the poverty 
rates. This is usually why critics of GDP and other economic indicators argue that, just because the 
numbers are increasing, it does not mean that things are improving and in most cases, it is the 
poorest in society that are affected the most. In 2010, the poverty rate had been slightly more 
reduced to 60.5% according to the WB. GDP rates have grown immensely during this period but the 
reduction in poverty has so far been limited.     
 
There are different factors that could explain the continued poverty levels, as mentioned in previous 
sections, employment conditions and income was sliced by private firms to increase profitability 
and this of course affected poverty at least in the Copperbelt. Since 2012, however, the Zambian 
government raised monthly minimum wages for domestic workers, shop workers and general 
workers who are not represented by any trade union and not covered by collective bargaining 
agreements (United Nations, 2012). Minimum wages were increased by approximately 60% (Ibid.). 
This signals expectations of an overall improvement in wages as: it can be assumed that workers 
represented by trade unions will not earn below the minimum wage. It could also be further 
assumed that a worker in a mine/smelter would earn at least as much as, if not more than, for 
example, a cleaner or handyman. It has been reported that President Sata has indicated that a non-
Unionized industrial worker should expect to earn a minimum wage of US$ 195 per month 
(Ghaffari, 2011). Although this is unsubstantiated and does not have any official source it does 
show that the issue is being discussed and that people have ideas about what would be a “fair” 
minimum wage for industrial workers such as those working in mines or smelters. 
 
Effects on Education  
According the Zambian ministry of Finance and the national planning, one of the main constraints 
to inclusive growth is low employability (Bwalya et al., 2010). In 2004, only 24% of Zambians 
attended secondary school and only 18% completed the full 12 years of schooling (Ibid. p. 17). 
Bwayla et al also find that, there is a positive correlation between education and earnings and 
consequently raising poverty levels. The report however, does not give any indication whether 
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education has increased or decreased since privatization. However, considering the link between 
household earnings and education, we would argue that, with a decrease in employment and a 
decrease in earnings, we can say that education might have decreased. However, since we cannot 
say anything about earnings in the informal sector, it can very well be that education might have 
increased. There are also factors like education programs by NGO‟s that can increase education 
levels in the country. 
One of the things that Kaunda has been praised for in different literature is that he made education a 
top priority especially when he came into power right after independence. There is no doubt that, 
one of the policies or ways to encourage more of the population to join the formal workforce and 
consequently the formal economy is by education. A report by Luis Linares and Julio Prado clearly 
shows that, broad-based, inclusive growth, or transitioning to open access economies requires 
education (Linares & Prado, 2014). Though they problematize first the lack of jobs, which could be 
linked to the lack of industries in developing and transitional economies as a contributor to the 
growing informal sectors, they argue that, education can help bridge the gap. So that, all the many 
microenterprises that are found in these societies can attain formal skills and translate those 
entrepreneurial efforts into the formal sector and subsequently, be taxed and also create formal jobs 
rather than informal ones (Ibid.) Another way that education is relevant for inclusive growth is that, 
with more educated people, comes more people who are interested in the state of affairs. They can 
criticize what elites are doing and they can make changes by being active/activist citizens. With 
more people educated and participating in the formal sector, this will also decrease the number of 
„elite‟ not because their physical numbers will be reduced but as NIE points, increase the number of 
people who are interested in the market equilibrium rather than the ones set by elites. Increase 
participation will push the market into a more open society with more players according the theory 
of NIE. 
Sub-conclusion 
This section of the analysis highlights how important the different relations described in analysis 
one are to the current situation. The DAs favored the companies and this has been costly in regards 
to state revenue.  
State capacity is very important because, in making structural policies like privatization, there has to 
be constraints and regulatory conditions in place to achieve the anticipated effects. The secrecy of 
the DAs was also evident in the lack of CSR; though the DAs state that firms were responsible for 
some social services and local environment, when these responsibilities were disregarded, there 
were no consequences. It seems that, Zambia just implemented the policy and left the rest to 
investors. For example, the Zambian government hoped or assumed that, the new firms would 
bridge the gap for workers‟ pensions, social security and other social services that the state was 
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responsible for before. This, as we see it, are important clauses that the Zambian government should 
have been more stringent in explicitly specifying in the DAs and the DAs should have subsequently 
been available to the public and regulating authorities.  
The Zambian GDP has grown immensely this has however not been translated into significant 
reductions in poverty. Working conditions and standards of living have also not improved. Even the 
increase in GDP is to a large degree due to the world copper prices, there is reason to believe that if 
prices decline Zambia‟s economy will decline with it – emphasizing the importance of collecting 
current revenues.   
Final conclusion 
We argue that a mix of inherited western institutional structures, a weak state capacity, patron-client 
relations, over-dependence on copper and forced structures from external factors such as the WB 
and IMF constituted the privatization of the Zambian copper mines.  
The current state capacity is a result of inherited institutional structures and interrelations, such as 
tribal balancing, dating back to informal structures, when Zambia was colonized. All three different 
governments since independence has struggled to create a strong state capacity. In the attempt to 
achieve this, tribal balancing and elite bargaining has had both positive and negative effects.  
On the one hand, tribal balancing and elite bargaining maintained peace in Zambia after 
independence. This as well as a prospering economy and Kaunda‟s nationalization and Zambian 
Humanism, focusing on creating both economic and social development resulted in a big middle 
class. On the other hand, we dare to say that in the long run the practices were, and to some extend 
still are, at the expense of economic and social development. The inherited setup has paved way for 
formalized patron-client relations still existing, seemingly considering own interests instead of the 
interests of the Zambian people, which alleged nepotism and corruption both points to.    
Economically Zambia‟s over-dependency on copper, which we ascribe to the colonial structures as 
well, has challenged and still challenges the possibility for social and economic development and 
their attempt to achieve inclusive growth. The 1974 oil crisis was the beginning to a weakened 
economy forcing the Zambian governments to adopt and pass a series of reforms and privatize their 
main income sector, the copper mining as well as businesses in general in order to receive economic 
help from IMF, the WB and donors. With little control over their own economy and DA‟s to 
comply to, little money were directed to the state which is crucial to maintain and establish social 
development, resulting in an increase in poverty.  
After a long period of economic and social struggles, the Zambian economy is recovering – based 
on increasing copper prices, new tax regimes as well as the current government‟s will to turn the 
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recent profit into social development projects. This change is so recent though, that we cannot yet 
say if the social and economic development will sustain and contributed to inclusive growth. 
Our approach to the analysis has shown patterns in the economic, social and political relations 
repeating themselves over history. Client-patron relations still dominates the political arena, the 
economy is still dependent on copper-prices and social development is small.  
In times of high copper prices, the privatization has proved to be beneficial in terms of increase in 
employment and recently money being guided towards social development projects, which is in line 
with the inclusive growth approach. On the other hand, low wages and an increase in casual 
workers is a major challenge to achieving inclusive growth, since the approach emphasizes that an 
increase in living standards should be based on wages rather than income distribution. We partly 
ascribe this development to a weak state capacity not able to enforce rules beneficial to the Zambian 
people when bargaining with the economic elites controlling the privatized market.  
The current development leads us to conclude that the increase in employment and slow start to 
social development projects are in line with inclusive growth. There is potential, but also a risk that 
the private companies takes advantage of the poor state capacity ,which the increase in causal 
workers and low wages point to. Furthermore, there is a risk that in potential times of declining 
copper prices the private companies will yet again, as our historical approach to the analysis has 
proven, abandon the little social responsibilities they have undertaken and put more pressure on the 
Zambian government.  
Our historical approach has shown a country in rapid transition, as well as the new economic elite‟s 
(private companies) lack of will to contribute to the country‟s social development in times of 
declining copper prices. This is a potential challenge to achieve inclusive growth. The approach 
takes a long-term perspective emphasizing little change in the short run, which could challenge the 
people‟s expectations to the government and companies and potentially result in conflict.  
Ending on a positive note, we stress the potential for achieving inclusive growth although 
challenged in many ways. This requires companies to take responsibility and demand conditions 
fair to both the Zambian state and the private market, with a focus on social development. It could 
be beneficial for the Zambian state to implement regulations, in line with inclusive growth, on 
working conditions and wages in the formal economy. This could maintain workers in the formal 
sector and thus formalizing parts of the informal and unregistered economy, which is beneficial to 
achieving inclusive growth.   
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